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MEMORANDUM

May 9, 1985, Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 84-1479
HENDERSON (Sup' t) ..> e.+c..

Cert to CA2 (~imbers,
Cardamone; Van
Graafejland~iss.)

v.
WILSON (inmate)

1. SUMMARY:

(habe-::::::=...

'T'imely

Petr contends that

CA2 failed to accord the
===
to factual findings by the state 'T'C, that the rA

-----

- ----------~'-~~~--------------have dismissed
petr's habeas petn on the ground that the

issue it raises was raised (and rejected) in a previous habeas
petn, and that the CA erred in holding for resp on the basis of
United States v. Henry, 447

u.s.

264 (1980).

2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

In 1972, after being ar-

rested and arraigned in connection with an armed r6bberv during
~

which one of the victims was killed, resp was placed in a

ce~J

with a person who had previously agreed to act as an informant.
~-----..----.....__..~

The informant, Benny Lee, had been instructed to listen "to see
if [he] could find ou~" the identity of petr's accomplices, but
he had been told not to question petr in any way.

The cell in

which petr was placed overlooked the taxi garage in which the
robbery took place.

Immediately upon entering the cell petr ex-

pressed dismay over the view -- "somebody's messing with me because this is the place I'm accused of robbing" --and began to
talk to Lee about the robbery.

Petr told Lee that he had seen

-

the robbers commit the crime and that he had picked

-------

the money they dropped.

~

----

UE

-

some of

Lee told petr that he had better think

of a more convincing story.
Petr was later visited by his brother and learned that his
family was very upset over the killing.

~

'Petr became agitated

------

and, when he next spoke to Lee, he admitted taking part in the
robbery.

Lee reported petr's inculpatory statement to the oo-

lice.
Petr was indicted on counts of murder and felonious possession of a weapon.

In response to a pretrial motion to suppress

the statement made to Lee, the state (N.Y.) TC conducted a hear- /~

-

-

ing and concluded that Lee did not "interrogate" petr but only
listened and made notes.

Because petr's statements were found to

~

be voluntary and unsolicited, the TC denied the suppression motion.

Petr was convicted on both counts of the indictment.

The

~L-+-'

~pe~late

Division affirmed the conviction, and the

,__1-

peals denied leave to appeal.

.-1 _ A
~

t _

~ourt

of Ap-

t+/L-

Several years later, petr filed a habeas petn in the SDNY
(Carter, J.), asserting that the admission of his statement to
Lee violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment.
Massiah v. United States, 377

u.s.

~elying on ~

201 (1964), the l)c held that

)

the record did not show any questioning by Lee but onl.y spontane-~

ous statements by petr.

-............

------

Accordingly, it denied th-e petn.

affirmed (Mehrtens rDJ], Blumenfeld [DJ]

~

t_..,/"

r.A2

___..

,;0

P/1~

Oakes, diss.), and this

--0

Court denied cert.

~

conviction, contending that the admission of his statement to Lee

.

~

was unconstitutional in the light of Un1ted States v. Henry, 447
264 (1980).

This Court held in Henry that "rbJy intention-

ally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the r,overnment violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
274.

Id., at

In denying petr's motion, the state court found Benry dis-

tinguishable in that Henry's cellmate was a paid government
agent~

the court also held that Henry should not be applied ret-

roactively.

~,)

¥,

~~~

The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal.

~etr

---

then filed a second habeas petn in the SDNY (Gagliardi), in which

-

he asserted that Henry should be applied retroactively to require
retrial without use of his statement to Lee.

f) L . ~ tn.

The DC denied the

It noted the state 'J:'C' s findings that petr 's inculpatory

~ statement

1.....J
4;1J

In 1981 petr filed a motion in state court to vacate his

u.s.

.1"1

._,.,.

to Lee was a spontaneous response to the visit from

petr's brother and that Lee did not make any affirmative efforts

c_t

--

to elicit information from petr.

The DC observed that 28 u.s.r..
'

§2254 required that these findings be presumed correct, and it
concluded that the findings were supported by the record.
CA2 reversed.

It first held that, despite the fact that

~)- J (

petr's claim for habeas relief was the same as that advanced in
his first habeas petn, the "ends of justice" required that the
court consider the merits of his claim.

'!'he CA next concluded

~

that Henry was indistinguishable from petr's case; here, as in ~~

--

Henry, the government intentionally staged the scene that induced
'-----.....___ ---..._ ~ ....,
petr to make the inculpatory statement, and the informant acted
affirmatively to encourage the conversations that eventualJ.y led
petr to make the statement.

The r.A2 then held that Henry should ~

be applied retroactively, because Henry had not established

"new" rule of constitutional law, but rather had merely

a~f

appliec'l ~

~-~-~

Massiah to a new factual situation.

~

Judge Van Graafeiland, in dissent, argued that the police
L

-

had overwhelming evidence of petr's guilt and that they placed

~

£?~

~

Lee in petr's cell to discover the identity of petr's accomplices, not to elicit inculpatory statements from petr.

~he

rna-

jority's conclusion that Lee was "subtly interrogating" petr and
that the government "deliberately elicited the inculpatory statement" was contrary to the factual findings of the state court as
well as the conclusions of the DC and the CA panel on petr's
first habeas petn and the DC on this habeas petn, all of which
determined that petr's statements were spontaneous and were not
elicited in any way by the informant.

In Judge Van Graafeiland's

view, the majority had not adequately explained why the state

court's findings were not fairly supported by the record, as required by Sumner

~.

Mata, 449

u.s.

'

539 (1981).

Bebause three

federal courts had concurred with the state court's findings, the
need for such an explanation was even more imperative.

~he

rna-

jority's boilerplate statement that the "ends of justice" justified reconsideration on the merits was not sufficient.
3. CONTENTIONS:
to apply

~2254's

Petr contends that the CA erred by failing

presumption of correctness to the state court's

finding that Lee did not deliberately elicit the incriminating
statement.
Petr also contends that the Court should take this case to
address the extent of a federal court's powers in ruling upon an
argument raised in a successive habeas petn that was
the federal court that considered the previous petn.
v. United States, 373

u.s.

rejecte~

by

Tn Sanners

1 (1963), the Court implied that a

previously rejected ground for habeas relief should not be reconsidered in the absence of some factor showing that review would
serve the ends of justice, but the Court stopped short of mandating dismissal of a successive petn in the absence of any such
factor.

Petr suggests that Sanders should be expanded in accord-

ance with the principles of finality and deference to the role of
the states in the federal system that the Court has emphasized in
recent years.

Petr asserts further that if Sanders may be viewed

as permitting a federal court to reconsider a claim that has previously been litigated at every level of both the state and

fe~-

eral judicial systems even though there has been no intervening
change in the law and no other factors have been cited in support

of the claim that further review will serve "the ends of
/

justice," then it is time for the
to be reexamined.

guid~lines

announced in Sanders

The Court should require that a federal

court's conclusion that the ends of justice would be served by
reconsideration of a previously rejected claim be supported by
articulable objective · factors relating to the particular case and
include examination of both (a) the extent to which the alleged
constitutional violation impugns the determination of guilt, and
(b) the hardships that further review would impose on the state.
Petr also asks the Court to take this case to clarify the
import of Henry.

The CA9 has complained that "ft]he extent to

which Henry modified Massiah, if at all, is not entirely clear."
United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1238, n. 3 (1981), cert.
denied, 459

u.s.

942 (1982).

Petr notes that Henry was decided

on a sketchy record, and that it left open the question whether
the inference of deliberate elicitation otherwjse present in
Henry-like situations may be negated by direct evidence that the
accused uttered the incriminating statements spontaneously or in
response to impulses that were independent of the acts by the
government and its agents.

This case squarely presents that

question and it also provides the full factual record developed
at the pretrial suppression hearing.

In clarifying Benry, the

Court could also decide whether Fenry established a "new" constitutional rule that should not be given retroactive effect in collateral proceedings.
4. DISCUSSION:

Whether the government has "deliberately

elicited" inculpatory statements from an accused in such a manner

as to violate his right to counsel is not a purely factual issue.
CA2 thus was correct not to feel bouno ' under ~2254(d) by the

7

state court's determination that Lee did not deliberately elicit
petr's incriminating statement.

But the state court also con-

eluded that Lee simply listened and made notes, and there is merit in the argument that the CA failed to accord to this conclusion the deference required by §2254(d).
Petr's argument that the Court should reexamine and extend
} Sanders is persuasive,

In this case, there was overwhelming evi-

dence of petr's guilt, and requiring the state to retry petr for
a crime that occurred 13 years ago would entail significant hardship.

In this situation, it is difficult to see how the ends of

justice are served by reconsideration of petr's previously rejected claim, especially since the police obviously made a goodfaith effort to comply with Massiah.

And more generallv, as the

stay applications to this Court make plain, the lower courts are
in considerable confusion over the standards for evaluating abuse
of the writ questions.
ful criterion.

"The ends of justice" is not a very help-

Sanders is the last time the Court spoke to the

problem of successive petns, and petr is surely correct in suggesting that the Court's attitude toward the problem has changed
since Sanders.
Finally, I agree with petr that Henry is a confusing decision that needs to be clarified.
s.ct. 933, 936

(1985)

See also Sweat v. Arkansas, 105

(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

If one accepts

the state court's determination that Lee simply listened to petr
and took notes, this case presents the situation left open in

I~

footnote 9 of Henry -- "the situation where an informant js
placed in close p~oximity but makes n~ effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged."

447

also id., at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring).

u.s.,

at 271, n. 9: see

The Court has granted

cert in a case involving the application of Henry.
Moulton, No. 84-786.

Maine v.

But the situation and issue in Moulton are

quite different from the present case; Moulton concerns whether
Henry is violated if, in the course of investigation of uncharged
crimes, the police unintentionally obtain through an informant
incriminating statements by the accused that relate to a crime
for which he has been charged.

The grant in Moulton thus is no

reason to deny cert here.
I recommend CFR with an

e ~nt.

There is no response.
April 26, 1985

Lightsey

Opn in petn

lfp/ss Olj03j86

HENDERSON SALLY-POW

84-1479 Henderson v. Wilson (CA2)
(Argued January 14, 1985)
MEMO TO MY ANNE:
Again

we

have

a

case

that

illustrates

the

irrelevance of guilt under our system - as Henry Friendly
has observed.

Respondent was tried and convicted

York State court of murder and robbery.
opinion

of

CA2

recognized

"nearly overwhelming".
respondent's

guilt.

fleeing

garage

the

that

Even the majority

respondent's

as

to

identify

the

He
he

had
had

been

seen

robbed,

by

with

respondent's guilt,
other

Respondent was placed
being

held

on

a

guilt

was

There never was any question as to

two

cell with

different charge.

witnesses
armful

of

The police had

but were

participants

in a

two
"an

money" and accompanied by two other men.
no doubt

in New

in
Benny

anxious
the

to

crime.

Lee \·7ho was

The police

requested

Lee to listen to what respondent said, and particularly to
"find

out

involved".
him not

--

way".

to

the

names

of

Lee testified

the

other

two

men

who

that the police had instructed
~

"ask questions or question respondent

Respondent

talked

taking part in the robbery.

were

rather

freely,

and

in any
admitted

Lo

New

The

evidentiary hearing,
petitioner
Appellate
the

New

Some

but

years

habeas

only

statement

later,

to

Amendment.

listened

affirmed

Court

petition

trial

of

and

made

respondent's

Appeals

denied

respondent

asserting

Lee

after

court,

an

found that Lee did not "interrogate"

Division
York

State

York

filed

that

violated

his

He relied on Massiah.

to

first

under

and

appeal.
federal

admission

rights

The

conviction,
leave

the

his

notes.

of

the

his
Sixth

The DC concluded

that

the record did not show any questioning by Lee but only
spontaneous statements by petitioner.
and CA2 affirmed.
In
relying

We denied cert.

1981

this

Habeas was denied,

petitioner

time

on

the

United States v. Henry.

went

then

back

to

state

recently decided

court,
case of

The state trial court found that

Henry was distinguishable in that the cellmate there was a
paid

government

'!·he

court

agent who

accordingly

had

denied

interrogated
relief,

and

the
the

suspect.
Appellate

Division denied leave to appeal.
Petitioner
in

which

he

then

filed

a

on

Henry

and

relied

applied retroactively.
that

the

state

trial

second habeas petition,
also

argued

that

it

The DC denied the petition, noting
court

had

found

that

respondent's

inculpatory
and

that

statement

Lee

had

to

not

Lee

made

was
any

a

spontaneous

affirmative

elicit information from the respondent.
observed

that

presumeded

to

§2254

required

be correct.

that

This

the

New

York

to

The DC correctly

these

are

time CA2 reversed,

with

It held that Henry was
~

retroactive because it had not established

both

efforts

findings

Judge VanGraafeiland dissenting.

constitutional law,

response

new rule of

and it simply ignored the findings of
State

courts

and

the

two

federal

District Court that previously had reviewed this case.
I agree with Judge VanGraafeiland's dissent.
CA2

majority

inexplicably

failed

to

accord

The

proper

deference to the factual findings made by the state trial
court

on

two

occasions,

and

accepted

as

correct

by

two

different federal District Court in the two habeas corpus
proceedings.

Moreover,

these

findings

accepted by CA2 on the first appeal.

also

had

been

Although the Court's

opinion in Henry may not be one of our clearest, this case
is

distinguishable

however,
Mata,

449

was

in

u.s.,

from

HeD.f..Y_.

ignoring
at

the

548-49

to

The basic
requirement
the

effect

~rror

of

of CA2,

Summer

that

v.

federal

courts in habeas corpus cases must defer to purely factual
findings by the state courts.

q.

Unless
over looked,

If

my

there

is

something

have

completely

we should have summarily reversed this case.

clerk

agrees

it

is

unnecessary

memorandum.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

1

to

submit

any

arne 01/14/86

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

January 14, 1986

Anne
No.

84-1479, Henderson v. Wilson

(cert. to CA2)

(argument January 14, 1985)

Questions Presented
In the absence of an intervening change in the law or any
other

compelling

factor,

do

principles

of

finality

of

habeas

corpus litigation preclude a federal court from reconsidering an
issue that has been fully adjudicated by the federal district and
appellate courts pursuant to a previous petition for

a writ of

habeas corpus?l

lr have omitted four of the questions presented by petitioner
prison warden because their length and complexity suggests that
(Footnote continued)

'

·,

L..

Background
Resp was arrested for murder and was placed in a cell with
Benny Lee, who had agreed to act as an informant for the officer
investigating the crime.

During the time that he shared the cell

with Lee, resp made incriminating statements, which Lee reported
to

the

officer.

statements.

Prior

Following

supervising officer
that

the officer

to

trial,

a

hearing,

testified,

had

resp

moved

at

to

which

suppress
Lee

these

instructed

Lee not

The

instructions.

incriminating

utterances

"were

any interrogation by Lee."

and

the

the state trial court determined
to question petr,

merely to listen to anything that resp might say,
obeyed

the

and that Lee

trial court found

that resp • s

spontaneous and not a

Therefore,

but

result of

the court ruled that the

statements were admissible at trial.
Resp

was

convicted,

affirmed

his

convictions.

federal

habeas

petition

others,

resp's

claim

improperly

were

Amendment right

u.s.

201 (1964).

the

state

Thereafter,

in

that

admitted

and

the
his

at

resp

The

DC.

DJ

incriminating
trial

in

appellate
filed

his

first

evaluated,

among

statements

violation

to counsel under Massiah v.

courts

of

his

to

Lee

Sixth

United States,

377

In Massiah, the Court held that a defendant was

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
the issue on which this case may be resolved is very complicated.
As I hope that the discussion in my memo shows, the appropriate
analysis is reflected in your opinion for the Court in Stone v.
Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976), and your concurring opinions in Rose
v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545, 579 (1979) and in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 u.s. 218, 250 (1973).

Jo

denied his right to counsel when "there, was used against him at
trial

evidence

agents

had

of

his

own

deliberately

incriminating

elicited

from

words,

him

indicted and in the absence of counsel."

after

had

!d., at 206

been

(emphasis

The DC rejected the claim on the ground that the record

--

-

that Lee had not conducted an interrogation of resp and
~-

......

that resp's statements were spontaneous.
On
decision

appeal,

a

denying

relief.

------

divided

panel
The

"deliberately elicited"
the

he

federal

/

added}.
showed

which

test
__,______________

v CA2

of

affirmed

majority

the

reasoned

DC's

that

the

of Massiah was not met because of

'-----------------------~-

"complete absence of

interrogation"

In this

in this case.

connection, CA2 noted that the state TC's factual determinations
were

entitled

§2254 (d) •

to

The

court

surreptitiously
outcome:

was

"When

incriminating
informant,

that

elicited"

the

(1980).

under

the

elicited"

in

defendant
in

a

that

resp 's
makes

the

fact

that

Lee

did

not

change

the

cell
a

U. S.C.

completely

face-to-face

unsolicited, C/l2...

encounter

with

an

to be untrustworthy."
on

these

facts

incriminating

the

remarks.

Judge
State

Oakes dis sen ted,

had

"deliberately

This Court denied cert.,

945 (1979).

Then,
264

decided

28

he knowingly assumes the risk that his confidant may

reasoning

u.s.

a

also

placed

remark

ultimately prove

442

a presumption of correctness under

this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447

u.s.

In Henry, the Court considered the question whether
particular

facts

incriminating

the

Government

statements

from

had
the

"deliberately
defendant

violation of his right to counsel as construed in Massiah.

in
The

4.

Court found that the "combination of circumstances" , in the case,
in~ nt

which involved a jail house
.._

paid to furnish information

--::::!""----

about incriminating statements to the Government, supported CA4's
finding of a Massiah violation.
whether

the

statements

Sixth
to

an

The Court left open the question

Amendment would
informant

who

be

violated

served

simply

by admission of
as

a

"listening

post," making no efforts to initiate the conversation.
271 n.

9.

In your concurring opinion in Henry, you expressed

your understanding of the Court's holding:
of

a

Id., at

jailhouse

conversations

informant
and

to

who

engage

had
a

been

"(T]he mere presence

instructed

criminal

to

defendant

overhear
in

some

conversations would not necessarily be unconstitutional.

In such

a

actions

case,

the

question would

be whether

the

informant's

constituted deliberate and 'surreptitious interrogatio[n]' of the
If they did not, then there would be no interference

defendant.
with

the

right

to

counsel."

Id.,

at

276.

(Similarly,

the

v

Court's recent decision in Maine v. Moulton, No. 84-786, does not
reach the situation where the informant "does not participate in
active conversation and prompt particular replies," slip op., at
17 n. 13) •

The decision
this

case

denied

to

relief

squarely
wa-

file

in United States v.
his

on

the

rejected

in

~

,___

second
ground
a

prior

federal
that
CA2

it

Henry prompted

resp

The DC

habeas petition.
could

decision

not
on

reach
the

in

a

basis

claim
of

a

~--...-------------_...._ __

subsequent Supreme Court decision that expressly failed to reach
the -.-.
claim.

Relying on your concurring opinion in Henry,

the DC

also decided that the case presented no Sixth Amendment violation

5.

because

the

~-t_a__b_l_i_s_h_e_~_t_h_:__:__L_e_e_'_s _

"r! cord ,

a_:_
_t..___
i s ns did \

not constitute surreptitious interro ation."
A
ordered

different,
the

majority

DC

to

decided

consideration

of

and

divided,

grant

the

that

the

the

panel

writ.

As

"ends

merits

of

of
an

of

resp's

CA2

reversed

and

initial matter,

the

required

justice"
second

habeas

a

petition.

CA2 then reviewed Henry and decided that the facts of this case
were

substantially

reasoned

similar

to

those

of

that Henry did not announce a

Henry.

The

court

new constitutional rule

and thus was fully applicable to this case, without reference to
retroactivity analysis.

Finally,

the majority decided that the

facts of this case satisfied the "deliberate elicitation" test in
light of the decision in Henry.

Judge Van Graafeiland dissented,

noting that the majority conceded that proof · of resp's guilt was
"nearly
panel

overwhelming."

for

§2254 (d)

failing

to

--------

Judge
give

Van

proper

Graafeiland
deference

criticized
under

28

the

u.s.c.

to the fact-finding of the state court and for failing

to explain why,

in the absence of an intervening change in the

law, the "ends of justice" now required relief.
Discussion
This

case

presents

the

Court

with ~~

to

present clear guidance on when the lower federal courts properly
should decline to entertain a successive habeas petition raising
grounds

rejected

on

a

prior

petition.

As

one

argument

for

reversal, the State argues that, if the Court reaches the merits,
the Court should hold that the facts as found by the state TC do
not

amount

to

"deliberate

elicitation"

of

incriminating

6.

statements

in

violation

of

the

meaning of Henry and Mass iah.
reach

straight

important

the

merits

question

of

whether

entertained
important
lower

this

petition.

question

courts

petition.

In my view,

for

even

Indeed,

should
by

without

for

have

going

an

first

passing

review,

the

the

on

the

beg

the

whether

the

would

namely,

considered
to

the

properly

courts

approach

straight

within

the Court should not

lower

the

Such

presented

counse~

right , to

merits

merits,

of

this

the Court

would suggest that it was proper to do so.
I will state my analysis of
appropriate

reasoning

is,

I

this question briefly.

believe,

reflected

The

in your opinion

for the Court in Stone v. Powell, and in your concurring opinions
in Rose v. Mitchell and in Schneckloth v. Bustamante.
In Sanders v. United States, 373

u.s.

1 (1963), the Court

gave guidance on when it was proper for a federal court to refuse
to

entertain successive habeas petitions

and

determined

on

a

prior

petition.

controlling weight may be given
"only

if

application

(1)

the

was

(3)

ground

determined

prior application,
and

same

raising grounds heard
The

Court

to denial of
presented

adversely

to

the

stated

that

a prior petition

in

the

subsequent

applicant

on

the

(2) the prior determination was on the merits,

the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the

merits of the subsequent application."

!d., at 15.

In reasoning

that CA2 erred in concluding that the "ends of justice" required
consideration of

resp's

successive petition,

the State makes a

somewhat extreme argument that turns on omission from the current
habeas statute covering state prisoners of any reference to "ends

., .
of

28

justice."

u.s.c.

§2244(b).

In

~ffect,

the State argues
'

that Congress rejected an "ends of justice" inquiry and imposed
the requirement that the successive petition raise a new claim.
I do not believe that the extreme form of the State's argument
should be adopted,
helpful.
concept

though some of its statutory analysis may be

As drafted,
of

finality

section
into

2244 (b)

habeas

plainly does

corpus

import some

proceedings.

But

the

section is written in discretionary language; it states that the
federal court "need not" consider the successive writ unless it
raises a new factual or legal claim.

Within that discretion must

be some room to inquire into the "ends of justice."
1 think

that

the

focus

of

Accordingly,

inquiry here must be what does

the

phrase "ends of justice" mean in this context.
In Stone v.

Powell,

428

u.s.

465

(1976),

the Court held

that, absent a showing that the State did not afford a full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner was
not entitled to federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was admitted
at his trial.

The Court noted that such a Fourth Amendment claim

did not raise any doubt as to the prisoner's guilt or innocence.
Indeed, the evidence sought to be excluded typically is reliable
evidence
federal

of

In

guilt.

habeas corpus

this

review

context,

the

Court

"results in serious

observed

that

intrusions on

values important to our system of government," especially where
it

is

for

"purposes

other

than

to

assure

no

suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty."
(emphasis

added) •

But

federal

habeas

relief

innocent

person

!d., at 491 n. 31
is

afforded

to

H.

provide an "additional safeguard against compelling an innocent
man to suffer" such loss of liberty.

Id., at 491-492 n. 31.
./

Similarly,
Bustamante,
Stone

v.

in your

concurring opinion

in vSchneckloth v.

in which you proposed the rule ultimately adopted in

Powell,

you observed

that

recent decisions

tended

to

"depreciate the the importance of the finality" of prior criminal
judgments.

412

evolution of

u.s.

the

at 256.

use

of

This trend might be "a justifiable

habeas corpus where

the one

in state

custody raises a constitutional claim bearing on his innocence."
Ibid.

But, where the issue sought to be raised on federal habeas

did not bear on the prisoner's innocence, the "justification for
disregarding the historic scope and function of the writ" was not
apparent.

Ibid.

intended

to

You emphasized that federal habeas corpus was
afford
Id.,

incarceration."
discussion

suggests

means

257-258

at

that

for

"redressing
(emphasis

incarceration

is

unjust

an

This

added) •

"unjust"

where

prisoner raises a claim that casts doubt on his guilt.

the

See id.,

at 265.
Your
effect.
"that
586.

concurring

opinion

in

Rose v.

Mitchell

is

to 1 ike

There, you observed that habeas corpus assures society

no

innocent persons will be

--- ~

incarcerated."

443

u.s.

at

You further suggested that the disruption caused by federal

habeas review was unjustified unless the prisoner sought to raise
a claim that touched on his guilt or innocence.

!£., at 588 n.

10.
Accordingly, in these opinions, you explained that federal
habeas

corpus

is

designed

to

afford

relief

from

"unjust"

~-

incarceration and that incarceration is "unjust" when we have a
colorable
Though

basis

your

generally,
when

a

for

believing

discussion
the

in

discussion

these
takes

federal

court

raising

a

adjudicated

federal

habeas,

claim

it

should

may

that

be

the

cases
on

prisoner
concerned

added

entertain
on

a

is

force
a

prior

appropriate

innocent.

habeas
in

considering

successive

petition

application.

to

"extend

corpus

On

the

first

writ

to

cases in which the guilt of the incarcerated claimant is not an
Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 583 (Powell, J., concurring)

issue."

(suggesting

that,

even on first

federal habeas,

societal costs

may weigh in favor of limiting relief to claims bearing on guilt
or

innocence).

petitions,

In

light

however,

of

the

it makes

costs

imposed

by

successive

little sense to relitigate claims

that have nothing to do with whether an innocent person unjustly
has been incarcerated.
In
justice"

that

situation,

if

the

prisoner • s

bearing on his innocence.
in which the prisoner
as

where

encompass

a

he

require
with

a

to

came

counsel

the prisoner
"'colorable

Bustamante,

supra,

that

the

"ends

of

the merits of the successive
constitutional

claim had

some

Such a claim would not merely be one

forward

with

claim casting doubt on

right

argue

literally asserted that he was

finding process itself,
denied

would

require consideration of

petition only

such

I

new

the

evidence,

integrity of

innocent,
but

would

the

fact-

such as where he unconstitutionally was
at

trial.

Moreover,

the

Court could

to supplement his constitutional argument
claim

at 265-266

of

innocence.'"

(Powell,

J.,

Schneckloth

concurring)

v.

(quoting

lU.

Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?

u.

Judgments, 38

Collqteral Attack on Criminal

Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1960)).

I would like to point out that, by adopting such a rule,
the Court would not be treating state prisoners unfairly.
our

pretrial

procedural

and

rules

trial

proceedings

designed

to

protect

are
the

governed

Today,
by

accused.

many

Following

conviction, the defendant has the right to direct appeal through
the

state

system

and

ultimately

to

this

Court.

There

is

no

question that direct appeal ordinarily will identify unfairness
occurring

at

trial.

habeas relief.

Then,

the prisoner

has

recourse

to

state

On first federal habeas, decisions of this Court

permit the prisoner to raise most types of constitutional claims.
I have confidence that review by all of those courts will ensure
that

the

safeguards

prisoner
to

has

which

received
our

the

system

important

entitles

procedural

him.

These

comprehensive direct and collateral review procedures assure us
that the defendant has been properly convicted under fair trial
and appellate procedures, and
entertaining
demonstrate

further
that

the

applications
constitutional

suggests that he is innocent.
"colorable"

showing

there seems no justification for

of

unless
claim

the
sought

prisoner
to

be

can

raised

Requiring the prisoner to make a

innocence

would

ensure

that

further

review of the allegations of the petition, which otherwise might
be conclusory, was warranted.
The decision of CA2 in this case demonstrates the need for
guidance from this Court.

CA2 acknowledged that the decision in

Henry did not constitute a change in the law, but concluded that

.1.1.

resp should have the benefit of further, review in light of the
'

clarification provided

by

Henry.

Since

our

law constantly

is

changing in the manner represented by the "change" from Massiah
to Henry,
position

there never wi 11 be an end to habeas review if CA2 's
was

accepted.

The

approach

that

permit review under these circumstances.

1 propose would

not

The claim sought to be

raised by resp casts absolutely no doubt on his guilt and does
not suggest that he was treated so unfairly as to raise concern
about

the

integrity

of

the

fact-finding

process.

Under

these

circumstances, CA2 should not have entertained the petition.
Conclusion
On a successive petition for federal habeas corpus raising
a

claim adjudicated on

"ends

of

petition

justice"
unless

do

the

the merits on a
not

claim

require
sought

the
to

prior application,
court

be

to

raised

the

entertain

the

bears

the

on

prisoner's innocence and the prisoner makes a colorable showing
of

innocence.

In

this

context,

"innocence"

would

encompass

a

claim casting serious doubt on the integrity of the fact-finding
process by which the prisoner was convicted.

The prisoner would

not be entitled to further review on the ground that a subsequent
decision
unless

shed

the

"innocence."

some new light on claims previously adjudicated

subsequent

decision

had

bearing

on

the

prisoner's
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

April 3, 1986

No. 84-1479
Henderson v. Wilson

Dear Lewis,
I

shall,

of course,

as

soon as I

get around to it, circulate a dissent in
the above.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~U.Vrtm.t

<tfomt of tqt ~ittb ~taitg
11Jagqmghm, J). <!f. 2ll.;i~;t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 3, 1986

Re:

No. 84-1479-Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iuvrttttt <!}!tltrt ttf t4t 1!fuittb .§tatt~
Jla.s4Utgtcn, ~. <!}. 2ll'bi~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

/

April 3, 1986

No. 84-1479

Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
P.S.

This excellent opinion takes a significant step in the
right cti rec~on 1 n c Ontrolling successive petitions for
habeas relief.
I am delighted to join it.

.;iupuuu <lJMtrl o-f flr.t ~nit.tb ~bd.t5
Jlmdringhtn. ~. <!J. 21l&f"'&i
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 3, 1986

Re:

84-1479 - Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,juprtutt <!):ttnrlttf tl£t ~tb .:itws

._ufringhnt. ~. <!):. 2ll~~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 4, 1986

Re:

84-1479 - Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely ~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

,jtt}tftmt Clfttttri ttf tlrt ~~ .itattS'
~fringttttt. ~.

elf.

20&iJl.~

CHAMBERS OF'"

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

April 4, 1986

84-1479 - Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Lewis,
I

agree

with

Parts

I,

reserve judgment on the rest.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

IV

and

V

but

;&,

g-c'f-l't7<1 /(~~

---:------.

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum

.

'

J,t>bt-"r -;;~::z'ili:r '• _m.-,.- ~;l(!,'ii&~;.......,.."....a,~:-:"~•'((7..,..
'\.!"
~l

"'

rfrE-, ')/)5/rJ0

May 29, 1986

84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Bvron:
1 can, of course, understand your waiting to see
the dissent before deciding whether to join Parts 11 and 111
of my opinion in this case. If you will for.qive me for
bothering you further at this time, 1 write this note.
It occurred to me after nur brief and accidental
talk on Saturday that it was your opinion in Barefoot, 463
u.s., at 895, that first brought to my attention the importance of. the difference between "successive petitions" and
"abuse of the writ" in habPas cases. bee n. 6, p. 7, in my
draft opinion in this case. Although the ~ifference was
identified clearly in Sanders v. u.s., 373 u.s., at 15-17,
and we have relied on abuse of the writ several times in
capital cases, I do not recall our having retied on the
"successive petition" pronq of Sanders, now incorporated in
Rule 9(b) of the rules governing S2254 cases.
This case gives us an opportunity to do what you,
Bill Rehnquist and 1 - i.n parti.cular - have sought to do,
namely, establish that a successive habeas petition will be
rejected unless the defendant carries his burden of coming
forward with a colorable showing of innocence.
Sincet'ely,

Justice White
lfp/ss

.:iu:pumt QI4tnri ttt tlrt ~ro .:itatt.s'
~~· ~·<4· 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 9, 1986

84-1479 -

Kuhlmann v . Wilson

Dear Lewis,
I continue to agree with Parts I, IV and
V of your

circulating draft.

Parts

II and

III are difficult for me in light of Sanders
and the history of the 1966 amendments.

They

are also unnecessary to the judgment, and I
do not join them.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

i'tt.puutt

~~

1tf tlf~ ~niUb ~mug

'JJ'Mlrittgtott. ~. ~· 2.11.;m~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 12, 1986

J
Re:

No. 84-1479, Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
I am where Byron is.
I join parts I, IV and V of
your opinion. You will recall that I was in dissent in
Henry.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

arne 06/25/86

June 25, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-1479, Kuhlmann v. Wilson
The following is a draft hand-down speech for this case:

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit granting relief to respondent
on his successive petition for habeas corpus.
Prior to his trial for murder in New York court, respondent moved to suppress statements he made to a jailhouse informant
on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right
to counsel.

After a hearing, the trial court found that the in-

formant asked respondent no questions and merely listened to his
spontaneous remarks.

The court denied the suppression motion.

Following direct appeal,
habeas corpus relief,

respondent unsuccessfully sought

in both federal and state court,

arguing

that his statements to the informant were obtained in violation
of his right to counsel.

Later, he filed a second petition for

federal habeas corpus review, alleging that United States v. Hen..£:1_,

447

u.s.

264

(1980),

supported

his Sixth Amendment claim.

The District Court denied relief because the state court's findings

showed

that

the

informant made no effort of

any

kind

to

page 2.

elicit

information

from

The

respondent.

Court

of Appeals

re-

versed, reasoning that the facts of this case were indistinguishable from the facts of Henry.
We now reverse.
ed,

a

criminal

As the District Court properly conclud-

defendant does

not

establish a Sixth Amendment

violation merely by showing that an informant reported his stateOur cases establish that, once a defend-

ments to the police.

ant's right to counsel has attached, he is denied that right when
police "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from him in
the

absence

defendants

of

counsel.

from

That

standard

surreptitious

is designed

interrogation

or

to protect

investigative

techniques that are the equivalent of interrogation.

Therefore,

the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed
to elicit incriminating remarks.
The Court of Appeals in this case failed to accord to the
state

court's

required by 28

findings

u.s.c.

of

fact

§2254(d).

to which they are entitled,

the

presumption of

correctness

Giving those findings the weight

it is apparent that respondent has

not established a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

r--

The

Chief

Justice,

and

Justices

quist, and O'Connor join Parts I,
Chief

Justice,

and

Parts II and III.

J

ion.

---

Blackmun,

IV, and V of my opinion.

Rehnquist

and

O'Connor

also

RehnThe
join

The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opin-

Justice Brennan,

dissenting opinion.
ion.

Justices

White,

joined by Justice Marshall,
~

has filed a

Justice Stevens has filed a dissenting opin-<.

lfp/ss 06/25/86
'

84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson
This case is here on cert to the Court of
Appeals from the Second Circuit.
Prior to his trial for murder in a New York

Court,~ espondent

moved to suppress statements he had

made to a jailhouse informant - claiming a violation of
his right to counsel.

After a hearing, the trial court

found that the informant had asked no questions ~nd
?

had merely listened to respondent's incriminating
statements.

Accordingly, the court denied the

suppression motion.
Following direct appeal, respondent sought
habeas corpus

~ ]felief

relie~in

both federal and state courts.

was denied by each of these courts.

After our decision in United States v. Henry
(1980), respondent filed a second federal habeas
petition, arguing that in light of Henr ii?his statement
should have been suppressed.

Again, the federal

District Court denied relief,/ but a different panel of
the Court of Appeals reversed.

It reasoned that the

facts of this case were indistinguishable from those in
Henry.

we think the Court of Appeals erred.
failed to accord to the

sta~e cour~s fi~dings

the presumption of correctness required by
the federal habeas statute.

It
of fac jl

S2254(d~of

The facts in this case

were quite different from those in Henry. ~ hlere the
informant merely reported statements voluntarily made
~~
by respondent. Every court that ~considered this case,
/ state and federal j' has accepted the basic findings of
fact that the Court of Appeals simply rejected.
Therefore,( and for reasons more fully stated
in our opinion today ;)we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The Chief Justice, and Justices White,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor join Parts I, IV, and
V of my opinion.

The Chief Justice, and Justices

Rehnquist and O'Connor also join Parts II and III.
Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion.

The

Justice

Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, has filed a
dissenting opinion.
dissenting opinion.

Justice Stevens also has filed a

#84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson (Anne)
LFP for the Court
1st draft 4/2/86
2nd draft 6/16/86
Joined by SOC 4/3/86
WHR 4/4/86
CJ 4/28/86
BRW agrees with Parts I, IV and V 4/4/86
BRW continues to agree with I, IV and V, but
cannot join II and III - 6/9/86.
HAB agrees with BRW 6/12/86
CJ concurring
1st draft 5/28/86
JPS dissenting
1st draft 6/9/86
2nd draft 6/13/86
WJB dissenting
1st draft 6/11/86
3rd draft 6/17/86
4th draft 6/23/86
Joined by TM 6/11/86
WJB will dissent 4/3/86
TM awaiting dissent 4/3/86
JPS awaiting dissent 4/3/86

June 29, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Allen v. Hardy, No. 85-6593

No. 85-6748, Williams v. Illinois
Petr, who is black, pleaded guilty to murder, and a
jury sentenced him to death. 111. Sup. Ct. affirmed, People
v. Williams, 97 111.2d 252 (1983), and we denied certiorari,
466 u.s. 981 (1984). Petr then filed this petition for
post-conviction relief in 111. Cir. Ct. That court dismissed the petition, and 111. Sup. Ct. affirmed.
111. Sup. Ct. considered petr's contention that his
constitutional rights were violated by the State's exercise
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury
that sentenced him to death. The court noted that it had
rejected this contention on direct appeal and that its decision there ordinarily would be res judicata. The court went
on, however, to consider a study and an article offered by
petr, holding that this evidence did not satisfy the standard of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965).
Seeking cert., petr summarizes the evidence in his
case, which consists both of proof concerning the State's
peremptory challenges at his trial and of data concerning
the racial composition of juries seated in capital cases in
Cook County, 111. Re claims that this evidence raised a
prima facie case of purposeful, systematic exclusion. The
State responds by arguing that, even if Batson v. Kentucky
applies retroactively, petr's allegations are irrelevant
becausP they focus on the standard of Swain.
1 will vote to deny this petition. Although the facts
concerning the State's use of peremptory challenges at
petr's trial may well raise a prima facie case under Batson,
Allen v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, holds that Batson does not
apply on collateral review of a conviction that became final
before our decision was announced. Petr's claim under Swain
is not certworthy.
My vote is to deny.

L.F.P., Jr.

July 1, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 85-1479

No. 85-567, Wainwriqht v. Sonqer
In 1974, resp was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. On direct appeal, we GVR'd for resentencing under
Gardner v. Florida, 430 u.s. 349 (1977). Songer v. Florida,
430 u.s. 952 (1977). At resentencing, the TC refused to
hear additional evidence and reimposed the death sentence
for the same reasons originally relied upon. On direct appeal, Fla. Sup. Ct. affirmed, rejecting resp's contention
that the Fla. death penalty scheme violated Lockett v. Ohio,
438 u.s. 586 (1978), by limiting admission and consideration
of mitigating evidence to those categories of evidence listed in the statute, 365 So.2d 696 {1978), cert. ~enied, 441
u.s. 956 (1979).
Resp then unsuccessfully sought state habeas corpus
relief by filing a Rule 3.850 motion. After a hearing, the
trial court denied relief and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Songer v. State, 419 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1982). Resp
also was unsuccessful in his subsequent attempt to obtain
federal habeas corpus relief. The federal DC considered
resp's claim under Lockett as part of an ineffective assistance argument, concluding that counsel's failure to put on
nonstatutory mitigating evidence was a reasonable mistake.
The DC denied relief, CAll affirmed without discussing the
Lockett issue, 733 F.2d 788, and we denied cert., No. 845690 (1985).
Resp again sought post-conviction relief in state
court. In this proceeding, the original TJ stated that at
the time of resp's trial, he had interpreted the Fla. statute as requiring him to consider only those categories of
mitigating evidence listed in the statute. The iudge also
suggested that he had not considered any nonstatutory mitigating evidence. But the TJ denied relief, and Fla. Sup.
Ct. affirmed, 463 So.2d 229 (1985).
Resp then filed his second petition for federal habeas
corpus relief. The DC dismissed the application on the
grounds that the ends of justice would not be served by reconsideration of the issues presented. Sitting en bane,
CAll reversed and remanded, ~ith instructions to the DC to

2.

order the State to hold a new sentencing hearing. The court
reasoned that the TJ's statements demonstrated new and different grounds for relief that resp could not have raised on
his first federal habeas petition. The court concluded that
the TJ's failure to consider any nonstatutory mitigating
evidence constituted a clear violation of Lockett and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104 (1982).
We held this petition for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, No. 841479, because the cert. petition filed by the Fla. prison
warden argues that CAll erred in concluding that the ••ends
of justice" would be served by reconsideration of the merits
of this successive petition. A GVR in liqht of Wilson would
not be appropriate since our iudgment there did not rest on
the standard that should govern successive review. Moreover, the standard adopted by the plurality in Wilson pertains to successive review of a conviction, while this case
involves review of a death sentence.
1 recommend that we hold this petition for Hitchcock v.
Wainwright, No. 85-6756 (cert. granted June 9, 1986). In
Hitchcock, we wtll consider Florida's pre-Lockett rule,
which may have ha~ the effect of ~imiting introduction of
mitiqating evidence to c~rt~in categories provided in the
statute.
~A1l'g decision here r.ested on its conclusion
that such rule violated our holrlinqs in Lockett and Eddings,
and our disposition in Bitchock will she~ liqht on the question whether CAll's decision was ~orrect.
~V

vote is to hold for Hitchcock v. Wainwriqht, No. 85-

6756.

L.F.P., Jr.

July 1, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCB
Re:

Cases Held for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 85-1479

No. 85-276, Lockhart v. Walker
Resp was convicted for a murder that occurred in 1963,
and sentenced to death. Ark. Sup. Ct. remanded for a new
trial. Prior to retrial, resp unsuccessfully moved to recuse the TJ on the ground that the TJ was biased against
him. Resp again was convicted and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. 'l 'he conviction was affirmed on direct appeal,
Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300 (1966), cert. denied, 386 u.s.
682 (1967) •
Resp filed his first petition for federal habeas relief,
alleging that the TJ was biased and that the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence. The DC denied the writ, and
CA8 affirmed. Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (CA8 1969).
ln 1981, resp filed a second federal habeas petition. Applying the guidelines set out in Sanders v. United States,
373 u.s. 1 (1963), the DC refused to permit resp to
relitiqate his claims concerning the TJ's bias and the
State's suppression of evidence. Sitting en bane, CA8 affirmed, over the dissent of four judges, on the ground that
resp failed to establish that the "ends of justice" would be
served by successive review.
Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d
1238 (CAS 1984).
Resp moved for recall of CAS's mandate on the basis of
"newly discovered evidence." CAS ordered the DC to hold a
hearing to consider the new evidence. After the hearing,
the DC again decided that the ends of justice did not require reconsideration of resp's claims. Among the items of
evidence allegedly suppressed by the State was a transcript
of a conversation that took place in 1963 between resp's
confederate and the confederate's sister, in which the confederate made statements suggesting that it was he, and not
resp, who had committed the murder. The en bane CAS reversed, again over the dissent of four judges.
CAB's rested its decision on two separate grounds.
First, the court considered "whether the new evidence sufficiently tips the balance of the ends of justice standard to
permit us to reconsider" resp's claims. The appropriate
standard for making this determination was "not whether the
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district court or this court would find the new evidence
credible, but whether the evidence possesses sufficient
credibility that it should be heard by the real factfinder:
the jury."
CAS assessed the new evidence under that standard and decided that the evidence created "sufficient additional doubt" about resp's quilt so that the ends of justice
required successive review. The court held that resp was
entitled to relief on the ground that the TJ's bias denied
him a fair trial.
Second, the court determined that the suppressed transcript, which is described above, consti.tuted a "separate
and independent ground" for granting habeas relief. The
court noted that "where the defendant has made general requests for all exculpatory material, the conviction will be
set aside only if 'the omitted evidence creates a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist.'" Quoting United States
v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97, 108 (1976}). CA8 determined that the
transcript was authentic, that it would be admissible in
evidence at trial, that it had been suppressed by the State,
and that it was both favorable to resp and material on the
question of his guilt. With respect to the issue of materiality, CA8 concluded that the transcript itself was "sufficient to create a reasonable doubt" about resp's quilt.
Therefore, suppression of the transcript violated resp·~
right to due process and constituted an lndependent ground
for federal habeas relief.
The Arkansas prison wftr~en has filed a cert. petition,
challenging CA8's conclusion respecting the TJ's bias, its
standard for deciding when n~w evidence iustifies successive
review, and its determination that the transcript was authentic. We held the petition for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, No.
84-1479. A GVR in light of ~itson would not be aPPropriate,
since our judgment did not rest on the standard governing
successive review.
Although CAS's "endq of justice" analysis was dubious,
my vote is to deny this petition. The alternative ground
for CAS's decision, i.e., its holding on the Brady violation, appears to be consistent with our cases.
This case
was decided prior to our decision in United States v.
Bagley, 105 s.ct. 3375 (1985), which sets out the standard
of materiality to be applied in evaluating a Brady violation. But CAS's conclusion on this issue is not inconsistent with Bagley. Since CAB's iudgment rests on this independent ground, and its conclusion on that ground appears
correct, further review is not warranted.

3.

My vote is to deny.

L.F.P., Jr.

July 1, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

Cases Held for Kuhlmann v . Wilson, 85-1479

No. 85-567, Wainwright v. Songer
ln 1974, resp was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. On direct appeal, we GVR'd for resentencing under
Gardner v. Florida, 430 u.s . 349 (1977). Songer v. Florida,
430 u.s. 952 (1977).
At resentencing, the TC refused to
hear additional evidence and reimposed the death sentence
for the same reasons originally relied upon. On direct appeal, Fla. Sup. Ct. affirmed, rejecting reap's contention
that the Fla. death penalty scheme violated Lockett v. Ohio,
438 u.s. 586 (1978), by limiting admission and consideration
of mitigatinq evidence to those categories "f evi1ence listed in the statute, 365 So.2d 696 (1978), cert. denied, 441
u.s. 956 (1979).

Resp then unsucces~fully sougl)t state habeas corPlS
relief by filing a Rule 3.850 motion. After a hearing, the
trial court denied relief and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Sonr:ter v. State, 419 So.2rl 1044 ( .F lll'l. 1.982). Resp
also was unsuccessful in his subsequent attempt to obtain
federal habeas corpus relief. The federal DC considered
resp's claim under Lockett as part of an ineffective assistance argument, concluding that counsel's failure to put on
nonstatutory mitigating evidence was a reasonable mistake.
The DC denied relief, CAll affirmed wi.thout discussing the
Lockett issue, 733 F.2d 788, and we denied cert ., No. 845690 (1985).

Resp again sought post-conviction relief in state
court. In this proceeding, the original TJ stated that at
the time of resp's trial, he had interpreted the Fla. statute as requiring him to consider only those categories of
mitigating evidence listed in the statute . The judge also
suggested that he had not considered any nonstatutory mitigating evidence . But the TJ denied relief, and Fla. Sup .
Ct. affirmed, 463 So.2d 229 (1985).
Resp then filed his second petition for federal habeas
corpus relief . The DC dismissed the application on the
grounds that the ends of justice would not be served by reconsideration of the issues presented. Sitting en bane ,
CAll reversed. The court reasoned that the TJ's statements

2.

demonstrated new and different grounds for relief that resp
could not have raised on his first federal habeas petition.
The court concluded that the TJ's failure to consider any
nonstatutory mitigating evidence constituted a clear violation of Lockett and Eddi.ngs v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104
(1982) •
We held this petition for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, No. 841479, because the cert. petition filed by the Fla. prison
warden argues that CAll erred in concluding that the "ends
of justice" would be served by reconsideration of the merits
of this successive petition. A GVR in light of Wilson would
not be appropriate since our judgment there did not rest on
a decision respecting the standard federal courts should
apply when confronted with a successive petition for habeas
corpus relief.
1 recommend that we hold this petition for Hitchcock v.
Wainwright, No. 85-6756, in which we will consider Florida's
pre-Lockett rule, which may have had the effect of limiting
introduction of mitigating evidence to certain categories
provided in the statute.

L• .F.P., Jr.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1479

R. H. KUHLMANN, SUPERINTENDENT, SULLIVAN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, PETITIONER v.
JOSEPH ALLAN WILSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III
in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join.
This case requires us to define the circumstances under
which federal courts should entertain a state prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus that raises claims rejected on a
prior petition for the same relief.
I

In the early morning of July 4, 1970, respondent and two
confederates robbed the Star Taxicab Garage in the Bronx,
New York, and fatally shot the night dispatcher. Shortly
before, employees of the garage had observed respondent, a
former employee there, on the premises conversing with two
other men. They also witnessed respondent fleeing after the
robbery, carrying loose money in his arms. After eluding
the police for four days, respondent turned himself in. Respondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes
took place, claimed that he had witnessed the robbery, gave
the police a description of the robbers, but denied knowing
them. Respondent also denied any involvement in the rob-
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tails of his original account. Respondent then received a
visit from his brother, who mentioned that members of his
family were upset because they believed that respondent had
murdered the dispatcher. After the visit, respondent again
described the crimes to Lee. Respondent now admitted that
he and two other men, whom he never identified, had
planned and carried out the robbery, and had murdered the
dispatcher. Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements
and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surreptitiously while sharing the cell with respondent.
After hearing the testimony of Cullen and Lee, 2 the trial
court found that Cullen had instructed Lee "to ask no questions of [respondent] about the crime but merely to listen as
to what [respondent] might say in his presence." The court
determined that Lee obeyed these instructions, that he "at
no time asked any questions with respect to the crime," and
that he "only listened to [respondent] and made notes regarding what [respondent] had to say." The trial court also
found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." Under state precedent, a defendant's volunteered statements to a police agent were admissible in evidence because the police were not required to
prevent talkative defendants from making incriminating
statements. See People v. Kaye, 25 N. Y. 2d 139, 145, 250
N. E. 2d 329, 332 (1969). The trial court accordingly denied
the suppression motion.
The jury convicted respondent of common law murder and
felonious possession of a weapon. On May 18, 1972, the trial
court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life on the
murder count and to a concurrent term of up to seven years
on the weapons count. The Appellate Division affirmed
without opinion, People v. Wilson, 41 App. Div. 2d 903, 343
N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1973), and the New York Court of Appeals
denied respondent leave to appeal.
2

Respondent did not testify at the suppression hearing.
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On December 7, 1973, respondent filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Respondent argued, among other
things, that his statements to Lee were obtained pursuant to
police investigative methods that violated his constitutional
rights. After considering Massiah v. United States, 377
U. S. 201 (1964), the District Court for the Southern District
of New York denied the writ on January 7, 1977. The record
demonstrated "no interrogation whatsoever" by Lee and
"only spontaneous statements" from respondent. In the
District Court's view, these "fact[s] preclude[d] any Sixth
Amendment violation."
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d 1185 (1978).
The court noted that a defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment rights when the trial court admits in evidence incriminating statements that state agents "'had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of
counsel."' ld., at 1189, quoting Massiah v. United States,
supra, at 206. Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430
U. S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately
elicited" test of M assiah requires something more than incriminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel.
On the facts found by the state trial court, which were entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d), the court held that respondent had not established
a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3 We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Wilson v. Henderson, 442
u. s. 945 (1979).
The Court of Appeals observed that suppression of respondent's statements would serve "no useful purpose" because Cullen had not engaged in
"reprehensible police behavior," but rather had made a "conscious effort"
to protect respondent's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursuing a crucial homicide investigation." Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d, at
1191.
Judge Oakes dissented, arguing that the "deliberately elicited" test of
Massiah proscribed admission in evidence of an accused's statements obtained pursuant to the investigatory tactics used here. I d., at 1194-1195.
3
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Following this Court's decision in United States v. Henry,
447 U. S. 264 (1980), which applied the Massiah test to suppress statements made to a paid jailhouse informant, respondent decided to relitigate his Sixth Amendment claim.
On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion
to vacate his conviction. The judge denied the motion, on
the grounds that Henry was factually distinguishable from
this case, 4 and that under state precedent Henry was not to
be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y.2d
213, 423 N. E. 2d 366 (1981). The Appellate Division denied
respondent leave to appeal.
On July 6, 1982, respondent returned to the District Court
for the Southern District of New York on a habeas petition,
again arguing that admission in evidence of his incriminating
statements to Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
Respondent contended that the decision in Henry constituted
a new rule of law that should be applied retroactively to this
case. The District Court found it unnecessary to consider
retroactivity because it decided that Henry did not undermine the Court of Appeals' prior disposition of respondent's
Sixth Amendment claim. Noting that Henry reserved the
question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evidence of an accused's statements to an informant who made
"no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9,
the District Court believed that this case presented that open
question and that the question must be answered negatively.
The District Court noted that the trial court's findings were
presumptively correct, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and were
fully supported by the record. The court concluded that
these findings were "fatal" to respondent's claim under
Henry since they showed that Lee made no "affirmative effort" of any kind "to elicit information" from respondent.
' The trial judge found that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264
(1980), was distinguishable because the jailhouse informant in that case

was paid for reporting the defendant's statements to the police.
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A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741 (1984).
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" required consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact
that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned
that the circumstances under which respondent made his incriminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court concluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejected
respondent's claim had erred, and remanded the case to the
District Court with instructions to order respondent's release
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. - - (1985), to consider
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" required consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the
facts of this case. We now reverse.
II
A

In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respondent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals
5

Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority conceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed conduct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now unconstitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respondent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual determinations. /d., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregarding "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings
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relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963),
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "successive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ.
I d., at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sanders framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner
on a prior petition if "the ends of justice would not be served
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." I d.,
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sanders provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof
that a prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of justice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously
decided against him.
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opinare not fairly supported by the record." /d., at 749. In Judge Van
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' justify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has
gone on before." Ibid. (citations omitted).
'The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U. S., at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circumstances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition,
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle(s] him to the relief he seeks,"
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that
the prisoner has abused the writ. /d., at 17-19.
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ion of the Court of Appeals sheds no light on this important
threshold question, merely declaring that the "ends of justice" required successive federal habeas corpus review.
Failure to provide clear guidance leaves district judges "at
large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus,"
creating the danger that they will engage in "the exercise not
of law but of arbitrariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This Court therefore
must now define the considerations that should govern federal courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas
corpus.
B

Since 1867, when Congress first authorized the federal
courts to issue the writ on behalf of persons in state custody, 7
this Court often has been called upon to interpret the language of the statutes defining the scope of that jurisdiction.
It may be helpful to review our cases construing these frequently used statutes before we answer the specific question
before us today.
Until the early years of this century, the substantive scope
of the federal habeas corpus statutes was defined by reference to the scope of the writ at common law, where the
courts' inquiry on habeas was limited exclusively "to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal." Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 475 (1976).
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.
72, 78, 79 (1977); see also Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-468
(1966). Thus, the finality of the judgment of a committing
court of competent jurisdiction was accorded absolute respect
on habeas review. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
7
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the first grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts, included authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of federal prisoners. In 1867, Congress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the
custody of the States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474-475 (1976).
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U. S. 218,254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79.
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101,
104-105 (1942).

Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes a state prisoner's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the prisoner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amendment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Although the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially created exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice." I d., at 494. Among those costs
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a criminal trial "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,"
and exclusion of reliable evidence that was "often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." I d., at 490. Our decision to except this category of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger
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that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty."
Id., at 491-492 n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." I d., at 492,
n. 31.
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963),
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intolerable convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional
commands. But the Court never has defined the scope of
the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the
state courts. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia,
supra, at 426-434. 8
8
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases deciding that federal
habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims
plainly concern the "general scope of the writ." Post, at 3. The point of
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III
A
The Court in Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" directly from the version of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 in effect in 1963.
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both
federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no
federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a
person . . . , if it appears that the legality of such detention
has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and
the judge . . . is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be
served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in describing guidelines for successive petitions, Sanders did little more than quote the language of the then-pertinent statute, leaving for another day
the task of giving that language substantive content.
In 1966, Congress carefully reviewed the habeas corpus
statutes and amended their provisions, including § 2244.
Section 2244(b), which we construe today, governs successive
petitions filed by state prisoners. The section makes no refthose decisions is that, on balancing the competing interests implicated by
affording federal collateral relief to persons in state custody, federal courts
should not exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over a certain category of
constitutional claims, whether or not those claims are meritorious.
Whether one characterizes those decisions as carving out an "exception" to
federal habeas jurisdiction, as the dissent apparently prefers to do, post, at
3, n. 1, or as concerning the scope of that jurisdiction, the result is the
same, and was reached under a framework of analysis that weighed the
pertinent interests. Similarly, in Fay v. Noia, JusTICE BRENNAN's opinion for the Court expressly made a "practical appraisal of the state interest" in a system of procedural forfeitures, weighing that interest against
the other interests implicated by federal collateral review of procedurally
defaulted claims. 372 U. S., at 433. Of course, that the Court in Noia
adopted an expansive reading of the scope of the writ does not undercut
the fact that it did so by balancing competing interests.
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erence to the "ends ofjustice," 9 and provides that the federal
courts "need not" entertain "subsequent applications" from
state prisoners "unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on" the
prior application "and unless the court . . . is satisfied that
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the
writ." 10 In construing this language, we are cognizant that
Congress adopted the section in light of the need-often recognized by this Court-to weigh the interests of the individual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the
State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal
laws. 11
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the 1966 amendments, including those to§ 2244(b), to
introduce "a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas
corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 2 (1966) (Senate Report). Congress was concerned
• In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal
prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of fonner
§ 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice."
'"28 U.S. C. §2244(b) provides:
"When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person incustody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ."
11
Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review
is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts "shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (emphasis added).
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with the "steadily increasing" burden imposed on the federal
courts by "applications by State prisoners for writs of habeas
corpus." 12 /d., at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1966) (House Report). In many instances,
the "heavy burden" created by these applications was "unnecessary'' because state prisoners "have been filing applications either containing allegations identical to those asserted
in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated
upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed
the preceding application." Senate Report, at 2; see House
Report, at 5. The Senate Report explicitly states that the
"purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnecessary burden" by adding "to section 2244 . . . provisions for
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Senate Report, at 2; see House Report, at 8. The House also
expressed concern that the increasing number of habeas
applications from State prisoners "greatly interfered with the
procedures and processes of the State courts by delaying, in
many cases, the proper enforcement of their judgments."
ld., at 5.
Based on the 1966 amendments and their legislative history, petitioner argues that federal courts no longer must
12
The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge
Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states,
"The need for this legislation ... is demonstrated by the fact that the number of applications for writs of habeas corpus in Federal courts by State
court prisoners increased from 134 in 1941 to 814 in 1957. In fiscal 1963,
1,692 applications for the writ were filed by State court prisoners; in fiscal
1964, 3,248 such applications were filed; in fiscal 1965, 4,845 such applications were filed; and in the first 9 months of fiscal 1966, 3, 773 such applications were filed , yet less than 5 percent of such applications were decided
by the Federal district courts in favor of the applicant for the writ. More
than 95 percent were held to be without merit." Senate Report, at 4, 5-6.
Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus
filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. In 1966, a total of 5,339
such applications was filed. In 1985, 8,534 applications were filed. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S.
Courts.
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consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive
petition. We reject this argument. It is clear that Congress intended for district courts, as the general rule, to give
preclusive effect to a judgment denying on the merits a habeas petition alleging grounds identical in substance to those
raised in the subsequent petition. But the permissive language of§ 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain
successive petitions under some circumstances. Moreover,
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, which was amended in 1976,
contains similar permissive language, providing that the district court "may'' dismiss a "second or successive petition"
that does not "allege new or different grounds for relief."
Consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 2244(b), however, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28
U. S. C., p. 358, states that federal courts should entertain
successive petitions only in "rare instances." 13 Unless those
"rare instances" are to be identified by whim or caprice, district judges must be given guidance for determining when to
exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b).
Accordingly, as a means of identifying the rare case in which
federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a successive petition, we continue to rely on the reference in
Sanders to the "ends of justice." Our task is to provide a
definition of the "ends of justice" that will accommodate Congress' intent to give finality to federal habeas judgments with
the historic function of habeas corpus to provide relief from
unjust incarceration.
B

We now consider the limited circumstances under which
the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional
claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the
13
The Advisory Committee Note relies on the "ends of justice" inquiry
described in Sanders to identify the unusual case where a successive petition should be heard.
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countervailing interests served by according finality to the
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the
prisoner.
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration.
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed
the prisoner's claims in several proceedjngs provided by the
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have
determined that his trial was free of constitutional error, a
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for
which he was incarcerated. That interest does not extend,
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harlan J., dissenting).
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the interests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes.
Finality serves many of those important interests. Availability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defendants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring
crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that they will escape punishment
through repetitive collateral attacks. 14 See Engle v. Isaac,
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly, finality serves the
""Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the law
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment."' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963).
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State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because "[r]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant
realize that 'he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in
need of rehabilitation."' I d., at 128, n. 32 (quoting Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963)). See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). Finality also serves the State's legitimate punitive interests. When a prisoner is freed on a successive petition, often many years after his crime, the State
may be unable successfully to retry him.'5 Peyton v. Rowe,
391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968). This result is unacceptable if the
State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the
"erosion of memory'' and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur
with the passage of time that invariably attends collateral attack.16 Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 127-128; Friendly, Is Inno15
Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the
delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will
be substantial. The delay in this case is illustrative. Respondent committed the robbery and murder in 1970, and was convicted in 1972. Direct
appeal was completed in 1973. The intervening years have been largely
consumed by federal habeas corpus review, with the past four years devoted to relitigation of respondent's claim that admission in evidence of his
statements to Lee violated the Sixth Amendment.
16
Finality serves other goals important to our system of criminal justice
and to federalism. Unlimited availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the "time of
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers" from the important task of trying criminal cases. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148-149 (1970). See Engle v.
Isaac, supra, at 127. Federal habeas review creates friction between our
state and federal courts, as state judges-however able and thoroughknow that their judgments may be set aside by a single federal judge,
years after it was entered and affirmed on direct appeal. See id., at 128.
Moreover, under our federal system the States "possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law," and "hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Ibid.,
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cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970).
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional
claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. This
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a decade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of innocence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress that
successive federal habeas review should be granted only in
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully
admitted. 17
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., concurring). Despite those costs, Congress has continued to afford federal
habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society
for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S.,
at 491-492, n. 31.
17
As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not,
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been unconstitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any
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c
Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of
respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming." 742 F. 2d, at
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this successive petition under§ 2244(b) on the ground
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim
was final. 18
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt
or innocence.
18
The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our opinion in several respects. The dissent states that the plurality "implies that federal habeas
review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his
first federal petition a properly preserved [constitutional claim]." Post, at
2 (emphasis added). This case involves, and our opinion describes, only
the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, the first six pages of the dissent have little, if any, relevance to
this case. There, JUSTICE BRENNAN merely reiterates at length his views
as to the general scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, with no explanation of how those views apply when a district judge is required to consider a habeas corpus petition presenting an issue decided on the merits in
a previous federal habeas proceeding.
The dissent further mistakenly asserts that we reject Sanders' holding
that the question whether successive review is proper should be decided
under a "'sound discretion' standard." Post, at 1. As we have stated,
the permissive language of§ 2244(b) of course gives the federal courts discretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and since
Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a general standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be appropriate. What Sanders left open-and the dissent today ignores-is the
critical question of what considerations should inform a court's decision
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IV
Even if the Court of Appeals had correctly decided to entertain this successive habeas petition, we conclude that it
erred in holding that respondent was entitled to relief under
United States v. Henry. As the District Court observed,
Henry left open the question whether the Sixth Amendment
forbids admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. 19
Our review of the line of cases beginning with M assiah v.
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), shows that this question
must, as the District Court properly decided, be answered
negatively.
A
The decision in M assiah had its roots in two concurring
opinions written in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959).
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.--,-- (1985). Following his indictment for first-degree murder, the defendant in
Spano retained a lawyer and surrendered to the authorities.
Before leaving the defendant in police custody, counsel cautioned him not to respond to interrogation. The prosecutor
and police questioned the defendant, persisting in the face of
his repeated refusal to answer and his repeated request to
speak with his lawyer. The lengthy interrogation involved
improper police tactics, and the defendant ultimately confessed. Following a trial at which his confession was admitthat successive review of an issue previously decided will serve the "ends
of justice." While the dissent today purports to provide some substance to
the Sanders standard by requiring a "good justification" for relitigation of a
claim previously decided, its standard provides no real guidance to federal
courts confronted with successive claims for habeas corpus relief. As to
the need for a standard, see pp. 7-8, supra.
19
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. (1985), we again reserved this
question, declining to reach the situation where the informant acts simply
as a "'listening post'" without "participat[ing] in active conversation and
prompt[ing] particular replies." !d., a t - .

84-147~PINION

KUHLMANN v. WILSON

20

ted in evidence, the defendant was convicted and sentenced
to death. I d., at 316-320. Agreeing with the Court that the
confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted in
evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring
Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to
counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. I d., at 325
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart observed, an
indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel
throughout the proceedings against him. Id., at 327. The
defendant was denied that right when he was subjected to an
"all-night inquisition," during which police ignored his repeated requests for his lawyer. Ibid.
The Court in M assiah adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that
right when federal agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating
statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. 377
U. S., at 206. The Court adopted this test, rather than one
that turned simply on whether the statements were obtained
in an "interrogation," to protect accused persons from "'indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even know that he
was under interrogation by a government agent.'" Ibid.,
quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62, 72-73 (1962)
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the Court made clear
that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation, and that it
so viewed the technique in issue in M assiah. 20
20

The defendant in Massiah made the incriminating statements in a conversation with one of his confederates, who had secretly agreed to permit
government agents to listen to the conversation over a radio transmitter.
The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation
relating to the alleged crimes." United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d, at 72
(Hays, J., dissenting in part).
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In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of
M assiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used
his position to secure incriminating information from [the defendant] when counsel was not present." I d., at 270. Although the informant had not questioned the defendant, the
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant
in order to "elicit" incriminating information. I d., at 273;
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts,
like the facts of M assiah, amounted to "'indirect and surreptitious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. I d., at 273.
Earlier this term, we applied the M assiah standard in a
case involving incriminating statements made under circumstances substantially similar to the facts of M assiah itself.
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - (1985), the defendant
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accomplice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. I d., at
The Court concluded that these investigatory techniques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pending charges.21 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, because of the relationship between the defendant and the
21
The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course,
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Molton, supra, at - .
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.informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit"
incriminating statements from the defendant. I d., at - - ,
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversation was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Ibid.
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL,
J., concurring)).
As our recent recent examination of this Sixth Amendment
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the
M assiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at - - , citing United
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to
the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that
the police and their informant took some action, beyond
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.
B
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from
any disagreement with the District Court over appropriate
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that open
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mistake, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correctness expressly required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Patton v.
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539
(1981).
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The state court found that Officer Cullen had instructed
Lee only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determining the identities of the other participants in the robbery and
murder. The police already had solid evidence of respondent's participation. 22 The court further found that Lee followed those instructions, that he "at no time asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending charges, and
that he "only listened" to respondent's "spontaneous" and
"unsolicited" statements. The only remark made by Lee
that has any support in this record was his comment that respondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes
"didn't sound too good." Without holding that any of the
state court's findings were not entitled to the presumption of
correctness under§ 2254(d), 23 the Court of Appeals focused on
that one remark and gave a description of Lee's interaction
with respondent that is completely at odds with the facts
found by the trial court. In the Court of Appeals' view,
"Subtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's]
already troubled state ofmind." 24 742 F. 2d, at 745. After
thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incriminating statements. Ibid. This conclusion conflicts with the
Eyewitnesses had identified respondent as the man they saw fleeing
from the garage with an armful of money.
28
The majority did not respond to Judge Van Graafeiland's criticism that
the court could not "dispense with the presumption that the State court's
factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation as to why the
findings are not fairly supported by the record." 742 F. 2d, at 749 (citations omitted).
2' Curiously, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that respondent
was placed in a cell that overlooked the scene of his crimes. Id., at 745.
For all the record shows, however, that fact was sheer coincidence. Nor
do we perceive any reason to require police to isolate one charged with
crime so that he cannot view the scene, whatever it may be, from his cell
window.
22
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decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed
this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and
intent of§ 2254(d).

v

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

lfp/ss 03/20/86

Rid~r

A, p. 25, 84-1479 Wilson

WILSON25 SALLY-POW
We read the reference in Sanders to "ends of justice" to
be consistent with the view that in limited circumstances
a successive petition may be entertained.

In considering

when it may be appropriate to exercise this discretion, we
bear in mind that the basic function of federal habeas
corpus is to provide relief from unjust incarceration.
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Thus, this peremptory holding would leave District Court
judges without guidance in disposing of successive
application for a writ of habeas corpus.
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these

statistics.

Professional

criminals -

and

even

the more casual type of criminals who support their drug

2.
'

t

addictions by robbing and mugging - count on the fact that
our system of justice is so slow and cumbersome that even
when

arrested

and

charged,

final

convictions

and

sentencing occur in a relatively small number of cases.
It

is

had

these facts

§2254 (b)
Crime

probable

Commission

that

Congress,

in mind.

appointed

by

When I

President

in

enacting

served on the
Johnson

in

the

late 60s, our studies revealed that a high percentage of
the crimes are never solved and

that the public also is

reluctant to cooperate with police because of retaliation.
I would not make a "big deal" of this, Anne, as you have
more important things to do.

I merely suggest that we see

what the FBI turns up after you have made clear what we
want.
2.

Perhaps the most critical paragraph in Part

III of the opinion is the concluding one that purports to
state

the

basic standard.

I

revision in this paragraph.

have

suggested

substantial

My objective was to make it

consistent with the clear intention of Congress, and also
with the statement that successive review should "rarely"
be

permit ted.

doubt

you

very

clear

can

Take

a

improve

that

close

look

at my

the language,

successive

review

revisions.

but we
is

No

should make

"rarely"

to

be

3.

allowed, and that there is a heavy burden on the defendant
who claims this right.
3.

I

think you

Part IV is excellent, and have

made few suggested changes.

It does seems to be longer

than necessary.

If you find opportunities to omit a few

lines

there

here

and

please do so.

without

weakening

our

argument,

But I am happy with the present draft.

* * *
As
highly

we

agreed

desirable

to

in

our

move

talk

your

on

superb

Saturday,
opinion

it
in

is

this

important case forward as rapidly as possible, consistent
with

the

care we

will

be

the

reviewed your
language

needs

customarily

editor.
draft

Please
twice,

little or

take.
say

I
to

and think

suppose

him

that

Cabell
I

have

that basically the

no editing except where Cabell

may think a statement is erroneous or could be framed more
artfully.

I

do

not

wish

to

retreat

from

our

basic

positions in both of the major sections of the opinion.

L.F.P., Jr.
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KHUL SALLY-POW
The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes the
plurality opinion in several respects.

The dissent states

that the plurality "implies that federal habeas review is
not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who
alleges in his first federal petition a properly preserved
[constitutional claim] . .

" (italics added).

This case

involves, and our opinion addresses, only the standard
applicable to successive petitions.

The dissent further

states that we "reject[] Sanders' 'sound discretion'
standard."

Of course, a district court must exercise

discretion when deciding whether to entertain a successive
petition.

Sanders left open, however, the critical

question as to the standard or considerations to be

2.

applied in determining whether "the ends of justice" would
be served by considering such a petition.

Moreover,

Sanders affords no guidance as to the meaning - in the
context of a successive petition - of the "ends of
justice".
Having criticized the plurality for not leaving
district courts free merely to exercise "sound
discretion", the dissent goes on to propose its own
newstandard:

district courts should refuse to entertain

"abusive, meritless petitions", but should entertain
successive petitions advancing a "potentially meritorious
claim" for which the petitioner offers a "good
justification" for seeking relitigation.

Post, at 9.

This twin-standard, in practical effect, would provide no
guidance to district courts.

If a petition is "meritless"

3.

there is a duty to deny habeas relief.

Many claims,

however, will fall into the dissent's category of the
"potentially meritorious".

It is as to those claims that

the standard governing successive petitions will make a
critical difference.
In this case, for example, respondent's federal
habeas petition relied on Henry, a case decided
subsequently to the first denial of habeas relief.

On its

face, respondent's claim properly required the District
Court to review the record to determine whether in fact
there was a "successive petition" that presented the same
question previously resolved both by the District Court
and the Court of Appeals.

In sum, although recognizing

that Sanders had provided no guidance, the dissent's
proposed standard would leave district courts and courts

4.

of appeals with meaningless "guidance" from this Court.
This is evident from the fact that the dissent would
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

That court

simply ignored the relevant finding of facts that had been
made by the state trial court, and accepted by both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals on the first
federal habeas petition.

In addition, the Court of

Appeals concluded, wholly without reasoning or analysis,
that the "ends of justice" required its decision.
infra, this opinion, at p. _ _ , et seq.
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In contrast,
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in this case where the
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federal
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Appeals'

decision approving repetitive review,
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reason other than its conclusory statement that "the ends
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courts
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the dissent proposes would leave

in second federal habeas corpus cases -
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No. 84-1479

R. H. KUHLMANN, SUPERINTENDENT, SULLIVAl
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, PETITIONER v.
JOSEPH ALLAN WILSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[April -

0

, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to define the circumstances under
which federal courts should entertain a state prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus that raises claims rejected on a
prior petition for the same relief.
I
In the early morning of July 4, 1970, respondent and two
confederates robbed the Star Taxicab Garage in the Bronx,
New York, and fatally shot the night dispatcher. Shortly
before, employees of the garage had observed respondent, a
former employee there, on the premises conversing with two
other men. They also witnessed respondent fleeing after the
robbery, carrying loose money in his arms. After eluding
the police for four days, respondent turned himself in. Respondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes
took place, claimed that he had witnessed the robbery, gave
the police a description of the robbers, but denied knowing
them. Respondent also denied any involvement in the robbery or murder, claiming that he had fled because he was
afraid of being blamed for the crimes.
After his arraignment, respondent was confined in the
Bronx House of Detention, where he was placed in a cell with
a prisoner named Benny Lee. Unknown to respondent, Lee
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had agreed to act as a police informant. Respondent made
incriminating statements that Lee reported to the police.
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the statements
on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right
to counsel. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on
the suppression motion, which revealed that the statements
were made under the following circumstances.
Before respondent arrived in the jail, Lee had entered into
an arrangement with Detective Cullen, according to which
Lee agreed to listen to respondent's conversations and report
his remarks to Cullen. Since the police had positive evidence of respondent's participation, the purpose of placing
Lee in the cell was to determine the identities of respondent's
confederates. Cullen instructed Lee not to ask respondent
any questions, but simply to "keep his ears open" for the
names of the other perpetrators. Respondent first spoke to
Lee about the crimes after he looked out the cellblock window at the Star Taxicab Garage, where the crimes had occurred. Respondent said, "someone's messing with me,"
and began talking to Lee about the robbery, narrating the
same story that he had given the police at the time of his arrest. Lee advised respondent that this explanation "didn't
sound too good," 1 but respondent did not alter his story.
Over the next few days, however, respondent changed details of his original account. Respondent then received a
visit from his brother, who mentioned that members of his
family were upset because they believed that respondent had
murdered the dispatcher. After the visit, respondent again
described the crimes to Lee. Respondent now admitted that
'At the suppression hearing, Lee testified that, after hearing respondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes, "I think I remember
telling him that.the story wasn't-it didn't sound too good. Things didn't
look too good for him." At trial, Lee testified to a somewhat different version of his remark: "Well, I said, look, you better come up with a better
story than that because that one doesn't sound too cool to me, that's what I
said."
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he and two other men, whom he never identified, had
planned and carried out the robbery, and had murdered the
dispatcher. Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements
and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surreptitiously while sharing the cell with respondent.
After hearing the testimony of Cullen and Lee, 2 the trial
court found that Cullen had instructed Lee "to ask no questions of [respondent] about the crime but merely to listen as
to what [respondent] might say in his presence." The court
determined that Lee obeyed these instructions, that he "at
no time asked any questions with respect to the crime," and
that he "only listened to [respondent] and made notes regarding what [respondent] had to say." The trial court also
found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." Under state precedent, a defendant's volunteered statements to a police agent were admissible in evidence because the police were not required to
prevent talkative defendants from making incriminating
statements. See People v. Kaye, 25 N. Y. 2d 139, 145, 250
N. E. 2d 329, 332 (1969). The trial court accordingly denied
the suppression motion.
The jury convicted respondent of common law murder and
felonious possession of a weapon. On May 18, 1972, the trial
court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life on the
murder count and to a concurrent term of up to seven years
on the weapons count. The Appellate Division affirmed
without opinion, People v. Wilson, 41 App. Div. 2d 903, 343
N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1973), and the New York Court of Appeals
denied respondent leave to appeal.
On December 7, 1973, respondent filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Respondent argued, among other
things, that his statements to Lee were obtained pursuant to
police investigative methods that violated his constitutional
rights. After considering Massiah v. United States, 377
2

Respondent did not testify at the suppression 'hearing.
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U. S. 201 (1964), the District Court for the Southern District
of New York denied the writ on January 7, 1977. The record
demonstrated "no interrogation whatsoever" by Lee and
"only_ spontaneous statements" from respondent. In the
District Court's view, these "fact[s] preclude[d] any Sixth
Amendment violation."
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d 1185 (1978).
The court noted that a defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment rights when the trial court admits in evidence incriminating statements that state agents "'had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of
counsel."' Id., at 1189, quoting Massiah v. United States,
supra, at 206. Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430
U. S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately
elicited" test of Massiah requires something more than incriminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel.
On the facts found by the state trial court, which were entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d), the court held that respondent had not established
a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3 We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Wilson v. Henderson, 442
u. s. 945 (1979).
Following this Court's decision in United States v. Henry,
447 U. S. 264 (1980), which applied the Massiah test to suppress statements made to a paid jailhouse informant, respondent decided to relitigate his Sixth Amendment claim.
On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion
3
The Court of Appeals observed that suppression of respondent's statements would serve "no useful purpose" because Cullen had not engaged in
"reprehensible police behavior," but rather had made a "conscious effort"
to protect respondent's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursuing a crucial homicide investigation." Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d, at

1191.

Judge Oakes dissented, arguing that the "deliberately elicited" test of
Massiah proscribed admission in evidence of an accused's statements obtained pursuant to the investigatory tactics used here. !d., at 1194-1195.
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to vacate his conviction. The judge denied the motion, on
the grounds that Henry was factually distinguishable from
this case, 4 and that under state precedent Henry was not to
be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y.2d
213, 423 N. E. 2d 366 (1981). The Appellate Division denied
respondent leave to appeal.
On July 6, 1982, respondent returned to the District Court
for the Southern District of New York on a habeas petition,
again arguing that admission in evidence of his incriminating
statements to Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
Respondent contended that the decision in Henry constituted
a new rule of law that should be applied retroactively to this
case. The District Court found it unnecessary to consider
retroactivity because it decided that Henry did not undermine the Court of Appeals' prior disposition of respondent's
Sixth Amendment claim. Noting that Henry reserved the
question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evidence of an accused's statements to an informant who made
"no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9,
the District Court believed that this case presented that open
question and that the question must be answered negatively.
The District Court noted that the trial court's findings were
presumptively correct, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and were
fully supported by the record. The court concluded that
these findings were "fatal" to respondent's claim under
Henry since they showed that Lee made no "affirmative effort" of any kind "to elicit information" from respondent.
A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741 (1984).
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" required consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact
The trial judge found that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264
(1980), was distinguishable because the jailhouse informant in that case
was paid for reporting the defendant's statements to the police.
4
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that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned
that the circumstances under which respondent made his incriminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court concluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejected
respondent's claim had erred, and remanded the case to the
District Court with instructions to order respondent's release
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. - - (1985), to consider
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" required consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the
facts of this case. We now reverse.
II
A

In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respond- .
ent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals
relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963),
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "succes5
Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority conceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed conduct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now unconstitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respondent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual determinations. !d., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregarding "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings
are not fairly supported by the record." !d. , at 749. In Judge Van
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' justify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has
gone on before. " Ib-id. (citations omitted).
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sive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ.
I d., at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sanders framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner
on a prior petition if "the ends of justice would not be served
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." I d.,
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sanders provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof
that a prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of justice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously
decided against him.
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opinion of the Court of Appeals sheds no light on this important
threshold question, merely declaring that the "ends of justice" required successive federal habeas corpus review.
Failure to provide clear guidance leaves district judges "at
large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus,"
creating the danger that they will engage in "the exercise not
The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U. S., at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circumstances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition,
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks,"
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that
the prisoner has abused the writ. Id., at 17-19.
6

'
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of law but of arbitrariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
This Court therefore
must now define the considerations that should govern federal courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas
corpus.

497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

B

Since 1867, when Congress first authorized the federal
courts to issue the writ on behalf of persons in state custody, 7
this Court often has been called upon to interpret the language of the statutes defining the scope of that jurisdiction.
It may be helpful to review our cases construing these frequently used statutes before we answer the specific question
before us today.
Until the early years of this century, the substantive scope
of the federal habeas corpus statutes was defined by reference to the scope of the writ at common law, where the
courts' inquiry on habeas was limited exclusively "to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal." Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 475 (1976).
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.
72, 78, 79 (1977); see also Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-468
(1966). Thus, the finality of the judgment of a committing
court of competent jurisdiction was accorded absolute respect
on habeas review. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U. S. 218, 254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the first grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts, included authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of federal prisoners. In 1867, Congress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the
custody of the States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474- 475 (1976).
7
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The Court initially accomplished this expansion
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79.
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101,

475-478.

104-105 (1942).

Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes a state prisoner's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the prisoner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amendment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Although the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially created exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice." Id., at 494. Among those costs
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a criminal trial "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,"
and exclusion of reliable evidence that was "often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." ld., at 490. Our decision to except this category of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger
that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." .
ld., at 491-492 n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no
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bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." I d., at 492,
n. 31.
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963),
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intolerable convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional
commands. But the Court never has defined the scope of
the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the
state courts. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia,
supra, at 426-434.
III
A
The Court in Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" directly from the version of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 in effect in 1963.
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both
federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no
federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a
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person . . . , if it appears that the legality of such detention
has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and
the judge . . . is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be
served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in describing guidelines for successive petitions, Sanders did little more than quote the language of the then-pertinent statute, leaving for another day
the task of giving that language substantive content.
In 1966, Congress carefully reviewed the habeas corpus
statutes and amended their provisions, including § 2244.
Section 2244(b), which we construe today, governs successive
petitions filed by state prisoners. The section makes no reference to the "ends ofjustice," 8 and provides that the federal
courts "need not" entertain "subsequent applications" from
state prisoners "unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on" the
prior application "and unless the court . . . is satisfied that
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the
writ." 9 In construing this language, we are cognizant that
In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal
prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of former
§ 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice."
9
28 U.S. C. §2244(b) provides:
"When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person incustody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicat.ed
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ."
8
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Congress adopted the section in light of the need-often recognized by this Court-to weigh the interests of the individual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the
State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal
laws. 10
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the 1966 amendments, including those to § 2244(b), to
introduce "a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas
corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 2 (1966) (Senate Report). Congress was concerned
with the "steadily increasing" burden imposed on the federal
courts by "applications by State prisoners for writs of habeas
corpus." 11 Id., at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1966) (House Report). In many instances,
the "heavy burden" created by these applications was "unnecessary" because state prisoners "have been filing applications either containing allegations identical to those asserted
in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated
•• Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review
is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts "shall . .. dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (emphasis added).
.
11
The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge
Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states,
"The need for this legislation . .. is demonstrated by the fact that the number of applications for writs of habeas corpus in Federal courts by State
court prisoners increased from 134 in 1941 to 814 in 1957. In fiscal 1963,
1,692 applications for the writ were filed by State court prisoners; in fiscal
1964, 3,248 such applications were filed; in fiscal 1965, 4,845 such applications were filed; and in the first 9 months of fiscal1966, 3, 773 such applications were filed, yet less than 5 percent of such applications were decided
by the Federal district courts in favor of the applicant for the writ. More
than 95 percent were held to be without merit." Senate Report, at 4, 5-6.
Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus
filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. In 1966, a total of 5,339
such applications was filed. In 1985, 8,534 applications were filed. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S.
Courts.
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upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed
the preceding application." Senate Report, at 2; see House
Report, at 5. The Senate Report explicitly states that the
"purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnecessary burden" by adding "to.section 2244 ... provisions for
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Senate Report, at 2; see House Report, at 8. The House also
expressed concern that the increasing number of habeas
applications from State prisoners "greatly interfered with the
procedures and processes of the State courts by delaying, in
many cases, the proper enforcement of their judgments."
Id., at 5.
Based on the 1966 amendments and their legislative history, petitioner argues that federal courts no longer must
consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive
petition. We reject this argument. It is clear that Congress intended .for district courts, as the general rule, to give
preclusive effect to a judgment denying on the merits a habeas petition alleging grounds identical in substance to those
raised in the subsequent petition. But the permissive language of§ 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain
successive petitions under some circumstances. Moreover,
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, which was amended in 1976,
contains similar permissive language, providing that the district court "may" dismiss a "second or successive petition"
that does not "allege new or different grounds for relief."
Consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 2244(b), however, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28
U. S. C., p. 358, states that federal courts should entertain
successive petitions only in "rare instances." 12 Unless those
"rare instances" are to be identified by whim or caprice, district judges must be given guidance for determining when to
The Advisory Committee Note relies on the "ends of justice" inquiry
described in Sanders to identify the unusual case where a successive petition should be heard.
12
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exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b).
Accordingly, as a means of identifying the rare case in which
federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a successive petition, we continue to rely on the reference in
Sanders to the "ends of justice." Our task is to provide a
definition of the "ends of justice" that will accommodate Congress' intent to give finality to federal habeas judgments with
the historic function of habeas corpus to provide relief from
unjust incarceration.
B
We now consider the limited circumstances under which
the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional
claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the
countervailing interests served by according finality to the
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the
prisoner.
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration.
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed
the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have
determined that his trial was free of constitutional error, a
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for
which he was incarcerated. That interest does not extend,
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention
will ul~imately be focused not on whether a conviction was
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harlan J., dissenting).
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the interests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes.
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Finality serves many of those important interests. A vailability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defendants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring
- crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that they will escape punishment
through repetitive collateral attacks. 13 See Engle v. Isaac,
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly, finality serves the
State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because "[r]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant
realize that 'he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in
need of rehabilitation."' Id., at 128, n. 32 (quoting Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963)). See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). Finality also serves the State's legitimate punitive interests. When a prisoner is freed on a successive petition, often many years after his crime, the State
may be unable successfully to retry him. 14 Peyton v. Rowe,
391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968). This result is unacceptable if the
State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the
"erosion of memory" and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur
with the passage of time that invariably attends collateral at13

"Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the law
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment."' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963).
14
Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the
delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will
be substantial. The delay in this case is illustrative. Respondent committed the robbery and murder in 1970, and was convicted in 1972. Direct
appeal was completed in 1973. The intervening years have been largely
consumed by federal habeas corpus review, with the past four years devoted to relitigation of respondent's claim that admission in evidence of his
statements to Lee violated the Sixth Amendment.
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tack. 15 Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 127-128; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970).
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional
claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. This
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a decade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of innocence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress that
Finality serves other goals important to our system of criminal justice
and to federalism. Unlimited availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the "time of
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers" from the important task of trying criminal cases. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148-149 (1970). See Engle v.
Isaac, supra, at 127. Federal habeas review creates friction between our
state and federal courts, as state judges-however able and thoroughknow that their judgments may be set aside by a single federal judge,
years after it was entered and affirmed on direct appeal. See id., at 128.
Moreover, under our federal system the States "possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law," and "hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Ibid.,
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., concurring). Despite those costs, we have continued to afford federal habeas
relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society for an
additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an
unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 491-492,
15

n. 31.
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successive federal habeas review should be granted only in
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully
admitted. 16

c

Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of
respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming." 742 F. 2d, at
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this successive petition under§ 2244(b) on the ground
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim
was final.
IV
Even if the Court of Appeals had correctly decided to entertain this successive habeas petition, we conclude that it
erred in holding that respondent was entitled to relief under
United States v. Henry. As the District Court observed,
As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not,
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been unconstitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt
or innocence.
16
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Henry left open the question whether the Sixth Amendment
forbids admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. 17
Our review of the line of cases beginning with M assiah v.
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), shows that this question
must, as the District Court properly decided, be answered
negatively.
A
The decision in M assiah had its roots in two concurring
opinions written in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959).
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.--,-- (1985). Following his indictment for first-degree murder, the defendant in
Spano retained a lawyer and surrendered to the authorities.
Before leaving the defendant in police custody, counsel cautioned him not to respond to interrogation. The prosecutor
and police questioned the defendant, persisting in the face of
his repeated refusal to answer and his repeated request to
speak with his lawyer. The lengthy interrogation involved
improper police tactics, and the defendant ultimately confessed. Following a trial at which his confession was admitted in evidence, the defendant was convicted and sentenced
to death. I d., at 316-320. Agreeing with the Court that the
confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted in
evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring
Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to
counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. I d., at 325
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart observed, an
indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel
throughout the proceedings against him. /d., at 327. The
defendant was denied that right when he was subjected to an
ln Maine v. Moulton, 474 U . S. (1985), we again reserved this
question, declining to reach the situation where the informant acts simply
as a "'listening post'" without "participat[ing] in active conversation and
prompt[ing] particular replies." !d., a t - .
17
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"all-night inquisition," during which police ignored his repeated requests for his lawyer. Ibid.
The Court in M assiah adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that
right when federal agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating
statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. 377
U. S., at 206. The Court adopted this test, rather than one
that turned simply on whether the statements were obtained
in an "interrogation," to protect accused persons from "'indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even know that he
was under interrogation by a government agent.'" Ibid.,
quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62, 72-73 (1962)
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the Court made clear
that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation, and that it
so viewed the technique in issue in M assiah. 18
In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of
M assiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used
his position to secure incriminating information from [the defendant] when counsel was not present." Id., at 270. Al18
The defendant in M assiah made the incriminating statements in a conversation with one of his confederates, who had secretly agreed to permit
government agents to listen to the conversation over a radio transmitter.
The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation
relating to the alleged crimes." United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d, at 72
(Hays, J. , dissenting in part).
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though the informant had not questioned the defendant, the
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant
in order to "elicit" incriminating information. I d., at 273;
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts,
like the facts of M assiah, amounted to "'indirect and surreptitious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. I d., at 273.
Earlier this term, we applied the M assiah standard in a
case involving incriminating statements made under circumstances substantially similar to the facts of Massiah itself.
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - (1985), the defendant
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accomplice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. I d., at
The Court concluded that these investigatory techniques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pending charges. 19 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, because of the relationship between the defendant and the
informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit"
incriminating statements from the defendant. I d., at - - ,
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversation was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation."' Ibid.
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL,
J., concurring)).
As our recent recent examination of this Sixth Amendment
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the
Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police in19
The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course,
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Molton, supra, a t - .
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terrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at - - , citing United
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to
the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that
the police and their informant took some action, beyond
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.
B
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from
any disagreement with the District Court over appropriate
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that open
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mistake, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correct.ness expressly required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Patton v.
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539
(1981).
The state court found that Officer Cullen had instructed
Lee only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determining the identities of the other participants in the robbery and
murder. The police already had solid evidence of respondent's participation. 20 The court further found that Lee followed those instructions, that he "at no time asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending charges, and
that he "only listened" to respondent's "spontaneous" and
Eyewitnesses had identified respondent as the man they saw fleeing
from the garage with an armful of money.
20
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"unsolicited" statements. The only remark made by Lee
that has any support in this record was his comment that respondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes
"didn't sound too good." Without holding that any of the
state court's findings were not entitled to the presumption of
correctness under§ 2254(d)/1 the Court of Appeals focused on
that one remark and gave a description of Lee's interaction
with respondent that is completely at odds with the facts
found by the trial court. In the Court of Appeals' view,
"Subtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's]
already troubled state ofmind." 22 742 F. 2d, at 745. After
thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incriminating statements. Ibid. This conclusion conflicts with the
decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed
this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and
intent of§ 2254(d).

v

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

The majority did not respond to Judge Van Graafeiland's criticism that
the court could not "dispense with the presumption that the State court's
factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation as to why the
findings are not fairly supported by the record. " 742 F . 2d, at 749 (citations omitted).
22
Curiously, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that respondent
was placed in a cell that overlooked the scene of his crimes. /d ., at 745.
For all the record shows, however, that fact was sheer coincidence. Nor
do we perceive any reason to require police to isolate one charged with
crime so that he cannot view the scene, whatever it may be, from his cell
window.
21
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JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III
in which THE CHElF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JusTICE O'CONNOR join.
This case requires us to define the circumstances under
which federal courts should entertain a state prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus that raises claims rejected on a
prior petition for the same relief.
I

In the early morning of July 4, 1970, respondent and two
confederates robbed the Star Taxicab Garage in the Bronx,
New York, and fatally shot the night dispatcher. Shortly
before, employees of the garage had observed respondent, a
former employee there, on the premises conversing with two
other men. They also witnessed respondent fleeing after the
robbery, carrying loose money in his arms. After eluding
the police for four days, respondent turned himself in. Respondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes
took place, claimed that he had witnessed the robbery, gave
the police a description of the robbers, but denied knowing
them. Respondent also denied any involvement in the rob-
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bery or murder, claiming that he had fled because he was
afraid of being blamed for the crimes.
After his arraignment, respondent was confined in the
Bronx House of Detention, where he was placed in a cell with
a prisoner named Benny Lee. Unknown to respondent, Lee
had agreed to act as a police informant. Respondent made
incriminating statements that Lee reported to the police.
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the statements
on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right
to counsel. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on
the suppression motion, which revealed that the statements
were made under the following circumstances.
Before respondent arrived in the jail, Lee had entered into
an arrangement with Detective Cullen, according to which
Lee agreed to listen to respondent's conversations and report
his remarks to Cullen. Since the police had positive evidence of respondent's participation, the purpose of placing
Lee in the cell was to determine the identities of respondent's
confederates. Cullen instructed Lee not to ask respondent
any questions, but simply to "keep his ears open" for the
names of the other perpetrators. Respondent first spoke to
Lee about the crimes after he looked out the cellblock window at the Star Taxicab Garage, where the crimes had occurred. Respondent said, "someone's messing with me,"
and began talking to Lee about the robbery, narrating the
same story that he had given the police at the time of his arrest. Lee advised respondent that this explanation "didn't
sound too good,"' but respondent did not alter his story.
Over the next few days, however, respondent changed de'At the suppression hearing, Lee testified that, after hearing respondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes, "I think I remember
telling him that the story wasn't-it didn't sound too good. Things didn't
look too good for him." At trial, Lee testified to a somewhat different version of his remark: "Well, I said, look, you better come up with a better
story than that because that one doesn't sound too cool to me, that's what I
said."
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tails of his original account. Respondent then received a
visit from his brother, who mentioned that members of his
family were upset because they believed that respondent had
murdered the dispatcher. After the visit, respondent again
described the crimes to Lee. Respondent now admitted that
he and two other men, whom he never identified, had
planned and carried out the robbery, and had murdered the
dispatcher. Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements
and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surreptitiously while sharing the cell with respondent.
After hearing the testimony of Cullen and Lee, 2 the trial
court found that Cullen had instructed Lee "to ask no questions of [respondent] about the crime but merely to listen as
to what [respondent] might say in his presence." The court
determined that Lee obeyed these instructions, that he "at
no time asked any questions with respect to the crime," and
that he "only listened to [respondent] and made notes regarding what [respondent] had to say." The trial court also
found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." Under state precedent, a defendant's volunteered statements to a police agent were admissible in evidence because the police were not required to
prevent talkative defendants from making incriminating
statements. See People v. Kaye, 25 N. Y. 2d 139, 145, 250
N. E. 2d 329, 332 (1969). The trial court accordingly denied
the suppression motion.
The jury convicted respondent of common law murder and
felonious possession of a weapon. On May 18, 1972, the trial
court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life on the
murder count and to a concurrent term of up to seven years
on the weapons count. The Appellate Division affirmed
without opinion, People v. Wilson, 41 App. Div. 2d 903, 343
N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1973), and the New York Court of Appeals
denied respondent leave to appeal.
2

Respondent did not testify at the suppression hearing.
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On December 7, 1973, respondent filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Respondent argued, among other
things, that his statements to Lee were obtained pursuant to
police investigative methods that violated his constitutional
rights. After considering Massiah v. United States, 377
U. S. 201 (1964), the District Court for the Southern District
of New York denied the writ on January 7, 1977. The record
demonstrated "no in~errogation whatsoever" by Lee and
"only spontaneous . statements" from respondent. In the
District Court's view, these "fact[s] preclude[d] any Si~th
Amendment violation."
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d 1185 (1978).
The court noted that a defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment rights when the trial court admits in evidence incriminating statements that state agents " 'had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of
counsel."' Id., at 1189, quoting Massiah v. United States,
supra, at 206. Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430
U. S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately
elicited" test of M assiah requires something more than incriminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel.
On the facts found by the state trial court, which were entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d), the court held that respondent had not established
a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3 We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Wilson v. Henderson, 442
u. s. 945 (1979).
3

The Court of Appeals observed that suppression of respondent's statements would serve "no useful purpose" because Cullen had not engaged in
"reprehensible police behavior," but rather had made a "conscious effort"
to protect respondent's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursuing a crucial homicide investigation." Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F . 2d, at
1191.
Judge Oakes dissented, arguing that the "deliberately elicited" test of
Massiah proscribed admission in evidence of an accused's statements obtained pursuant to the investigatory tactics used here. I d., at 1194-1195.
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Following this Court's decision in United States v. Henry,
447 U. S. 264 (1980), which applied the Massiah test to suppress statements made to a paid jailhouse informant, respondent decided to relitigate his Sixth Amendment claim.
On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion
to vacate his conviction. The judge denied the motion, on
the grounds that Henry was factually distinguishable from
this case, 4 and that under state precedent Henry was not to
be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y.2d
213, 423 N. E. 2d 366 (1981). The Appellate Division denied
respondent leave to appeal.
On July 6, 1982, respondent returned to the District Court
for the Southern District of New York on a habeas petition,
again arguing that admission in evidence of his incriminating
statements to Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
Respondent contended that the decision in Henry constituted
a new rule of law that should be applied retroactively to this
case. The District Court found it unnecessary to consider
retroactivity because it decided that Henry did not undermine the Court of Appeals' prior disposition of respondent's
Sixth Amendment claim. Noting that Henry reserved the
question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evidence of an accused's statements to an informant who made
"no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9,
the District Court believed that this case presented that open
question and that the question must be answered negatively.
The District Court noted that the trial court's findings were
presumptively correct, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and were
fully supported by the record. The court concluded that
these findings were "fatal" to respondent's claim under
Henry since they showed that Lee made no "affirmative effort" of any kind "to elicit information" from respondent.
'The trial judge found that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264
(1980), was distinguishable because the jailhouse informant in that case
was paid for reporting the defendant's statements to the police.
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A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741 (1984).
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" required consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact
that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned
that the circumstances under which respondent made his incriminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court concluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejected
respondent's claim had erred, and remanded the case to the
District Court with instructions to order respondent's release
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. - - (1985), to consider
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" required consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the
facts of this case. We now reverse.
II
A

In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respondent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals
5
Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority conceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed conduct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now unconstitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respondent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual determinations. !d., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregarding "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings
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relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963),
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "successive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ.
I d., at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sanders framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner
on a prior petition if "the ends of justice would not be served
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." I d.,
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sanders provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof
that a prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of justice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously
decided against him.
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opinare not fairly supported by the record." !d. , at 749. In Judge Van
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' justify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has
gone on before." Ibid. (citations omitted).
6
The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U. S. , at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circumstances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition,
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks,"
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that
the prisoner has abused the writ. Id., at 17-19.
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ion of the Court of Appeals sheds no light on this important
threshold question, merely declaring that the "ends of justice" required successive federal habeas corpus review.
Failure to provide clear guidance leaves district judges "at
large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus,"
creating the danger that they will engage in "the exercise not
of law but of arbitrariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This Court therefore
must now define the considerations that should govern federal courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas
corpus.
B
Since 1867, when Congress. first authorized the federal
courts to issue the writ on behalf of persons in state custody, 7
this Court often has been called upon to interpret the language of the statutes defining the scope of that jurisdiction.
It may be helpful to review our cases construing these frequently used statutes before we answer the specific question
before us today.
Until the early years of this century, the substantive scope
of the federal habeas corpus statutes was defined by reference to the scope of the writ at common law, where the
courts' inquiry on habeas was limited exclusively "to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal." Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 475 (1976).
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.
72, 78, 79 (1977); see also Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-468
(1966). Thus, the finality of the judgment of a committing
court of competent jurisdiction was accorded absolute respect
on habeas review. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
'The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the first grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts, included authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of federal prisoners. In 1867, Congress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the
custody of the States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474-475 (1976).
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U. S. 218, 254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79.
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101,
104-105 (1942).

Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed
from the reach of the federal ·habeas statutes a state prisoner's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the prisoner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amendment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Although the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially created exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice." Id., at 494. Among those costs
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a criminal trial "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,"
and exclusion of reliable evidence that was "often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.'! I d., at 490. Our decision to except this category of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger
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that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty."
!d., at 491-492 n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." I d., at 492,
n. 31.
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles." Fay· v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963),
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intolerable convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional
commands. But the Court never has defined the scope of
the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the
state courts. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia,
supra, at 426-434. 8
8
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases deciding that federal
habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims
plainly concern the "general scope of the writ." · Post, at 3. The point of

I
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III
A
The Court in Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" directly from the version of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 in effect in 1963.
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both
federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no
federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a·
person . . . , if it appears that the legality of such detention
has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and
the judge . . . is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be
served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in describing guidelines for successive petitions, Sanders did little more than quote the language of the then-pertinent statute, leaving for another day
the task of giving that language substantive content.
In 1966, Congress carefully reviewed the habeas corpus
statutes and amended their provisions, including § 2244.
Section 2244(b), which we construe today, governs successive
petitions filed by state _prisoners. The section makes no refthose decisions is that, on balancing the competing interests implicated by
affording federal collateral relief to persons in state custody, federal courts
should not exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over a certain category of
constitutional claims, whether or not those claims are meritorious.
Whether one characterizes those decisions as carving out an "exception" to
federal habeas jurisdiction, as the dissent apparently prefers to do, post, at
3, n. 1, or as concerning the scope of that jurisdiction, the result is the
same, and was reached under a framework of analysis that weighed the
pertinent interests. Similarly, in Fay v. Noia, JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion for the Court expressly made a "practical appraisal of the state interest" in a system of procedural forfeitures, weighing that interest against
the other interests implicated by federal collateral review of procedurally
defaulted claims. 372 U. S., at 433. Of course, that the Court in Noia
adopted an expansive reading of the scope of the writ does not undercut
the fact that it did so by balancing competing interests.
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erence to the "ends of justice," 9 and provides that the federal
courts "need not" entertain "subsequent applications" from
state prisoners "unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated· on" the
prior application "and unless the court . . . is satisfied that
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the
writ." '0 In construing this language, we are cognizant that
Congress adopted the section in light of the need-often recognized by this Court-to weigh the interests of the individual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the
State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal
laws. 11
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the 1966 amendments, including those to § 2244(b), to
introduce "a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas
corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Gong., 2d
Sess., p. 2 (1966) (Senate Report). Congress was concerned
9

In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal
prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of former
§ 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice."
10
28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) provides:
"When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person incustody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a
subs_equent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ."
11
Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review
is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts "shall ... dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (emphasis added).
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with the "steadily increasing" burden imposed on the federal
courts by "applications by State prisoners for writs of habeas
corpus." 12 Id., at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1966) (House Report). In many instances,
the "heavy burden" created by these applications was "unnecessary" because state prisoners "have been filing applications either containing allegations identical to those asserted
in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated
upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed
the preceding application." Senate Report, at 2; see House
Report, at 5. The Senate Report explicitly states that the
"purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnecessary burden" by adding "to section 2244 . . . provisions for
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Senate Report, at 2; see House Report, at 8. The House also
expressed concern that the increasing number of habeas
applications from State prisoners "greatly interfered with the
procedures and processes of the State courts by delaying, in
many cases, the proper enforcement of their judgments."
!d., at 5.
Based on the 1966 amendments and their legislative history, petitioner argues that federal courts no longer must
2
' The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge
Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states,
"The need for this legislation ... is demonstrated by the fact that the number of applications for writs of habeas corpus in Federal courts by State
court prisoners increased from 134 in 1941 to 814 in 1957. In fiscal 1963,
1,692 applications for the writ were filed by State court prisoners; in fiscal
1964, 3,248 such applications were filed; in fiscal 1965, 4,845 such applications were filed; and in the first 9 months of fiscal 1966, 3, 773 such applications were filed, yet less than 5 percent of such applications were decided
by the Federal district courts in favor of the applicant for the writ. More
than 95 percent were held to be without merit." Senate Report, at 4, 5-6.
Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus
filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. In 1966, a total of 5,339
such applications was filed. In 1985, 8,534 applications were filed. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S.
Courts.
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consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive
petition. We reject this argument. It is clear that Congress intended for district courts, as the general rule, to give
preclusive effect to a judgment denying on the merits a habeas petition alleging grounds identical in substance to those
raised in the subsequent petition. But the permissive language of§ 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain
successive petitions under some circumstances. Moreover,
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States Di~trict Courts, which was amended in 1976,
contains similar permissive language, providing that the district court "may" dismiss a "second or successive petition"
that does not "allege new or different grounds for relief."
Consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 2244(b), however, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28
U. S. C., p. 358, states that federal courts should entertain
successive petitions only in "rare instances." 13 Unless those
"rare instances" are to be identified by whim or caprice, district judges must be given guidance for determining when to
exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b).
Accordingly, as a means of identifying the rare case in which
federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a successive petition, we continue to rely on the reference in
Sanders to the "ends of justice." Our task is to provide a
definition of the "ends of justice" that will accommodate Congress' intent to give finality to federal habeas judgments with
the historic function of habeas corpus to provide relief from
unjust incarceration.
B
We now consider the limited circumstances under which
the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional
claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the
The Advisory Committee Note relies on the "ends of justice" inquiry
described in Sanders to identify the unusual case where a successive petition should be heard.
13
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countervailing interests served by according finality to the
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the
prisoner.
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration.
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed
the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have
determined that his trial was free of constitutional error, a
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for
which he was incarcerated. That interest does not extend,
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harhm J., dissenting). ·
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the interests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes.
Finality serves many of those important interests. A vailability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defendants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring
crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that they will escape punishment
through repetitive collateral attacks. 14 See Engle v. Isaac,
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly~ finality serves the
" "Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the Jaw
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment.'" Engle v. Isaac , 456 U.S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963).
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State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because "[r]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant
realize that 'he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in
need of rehabilitation.'" I d., at 128, n. 32 (quoting Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963)). See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). Finality also serves the State's legitimate punitive interests. When a prisoner is freed on a successive petition, often many years after his crime, the State
may be unable successfully to retry him.'5 Peyton v. Rowe,
391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968). This result is unacceptable if the
State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the
"erosion of memory" and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur
with the passage of time that invariably attends collateral attack.'6 Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 127-128; Friendly, Is Inno15
Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the
delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will
be substantial. The delay in this case is illustrative. Respondent committed the robbery and murder in 1970, and was convicted in 1972. Direct
appeal was completed in 1973. The intervening years have been largely
consumed by federal habeas corpus review, with the past four years devoted to relitigation of respondent's claim that admission in evidence of his
statements to Lee violated the Sixth Amendment.
16
Finality serves other goals important to our system of criminal justice
and to federalism. Unlimited availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the "time of
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers" from the important task of trying criminal cases. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148-149 (1970). See Engle v.
Isaac, supra, at 127. Federal habeas review creates friction between our
state and federal courts, as state judges-however able and thoroughknow that their judgments may be set aside by a single federal judge,
years after it was entered and affirmed on direct appeal. See id., at 128.
Moreover, under our federal system the States "possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law," and "hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Ibid.,
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cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970).

In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional
claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. This
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a decade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of innocence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress that
successive federal habeas review should be granted only in
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully
admitted. 17
citing Schneckloth v. Busta monte, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., conCUITing). Despite those costs, Congress has continued to afford federal
habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society
for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S.,
at 491-492, n. 31.
17
As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not,
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been unconstitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any

I
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c
Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of
respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming." 742 F. 2d, at
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this successive petition under§ 2244(b) on the ground
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim
was final. 18
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt
or innocence.
18
The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our opinion in several respects. The dissent states that the plurality "implies that federal habeas
review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his
first federal petition a ·properly preserved [constitutional claim]." Post, at
2 (emphasis added). This case involves, and our opinion describes, only
the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. The dissent further mistakenly asserts that we reject Sanders' holding that the question whether successive review is proper should be decided under a "'sound discretion' standard." Post, at 1. As we have
stated, the permissive language of § 2244(b) of course gives the federal
courts discretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and
since Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a
general standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be
appropriate. What Sanders left open-and the dissent today ignores-is
the critical question of what considerations should inform a court's decision
that successive review of an issue previously decided will serve the "ends
of justice." While the dissent today purports to-provide some substance to
the Sanders standard by requiring a "good justification" for relitigation of a
claim previously decided, its standard provides no real guidance to federal
courts confronted with successive claims for habeas corpus relief. As to
the need for a standard, see pp. 7-8, supra.
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IV
Even if the Court of Appeals had correctly decided to entertain this successive habeas petition, we conclude that it
erred in holding that respondent was entitled to relief under
United States v. Henry. As the District Court observed,
Henry left open the question whether the Sixth Amendment
forbids admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. 19
Our review of the line of cases beginning with M assiah v.
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), shows that this question
must, as the District Court properly decided, be answered
negatively.
A
The decision in Massiah had its roots in two concurring
opinions written in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959).
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - , - - (1985). Following his indictment for first-degree murder, the defendant in
Spano retained a lawyer and surrendered to the authorities.
Before leaving the defendant in police custody, counsel cautioned him not to respond to interrogation. The prosecutor
and police questioned the defendant, persisting in the face of
his repeated refusal to answer and his repeated request to
speak with his lawyer. The lengthy interrogation involved
improper police tactics, and the defendant ultimately confessed. Following a trial at which his confession was admitted in evidence, the defendant was convicted and sentenced
to death. I d., at 316-320. Agreeing with the Court that the
confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted in
evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring
Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to
•• In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. (1985), we again reserved this
question, declining to reach the situation where the informant acts simply
as a "'listening post'" without "participat[ing] in active conversation and
prompt[ing] particular replies." I d. , at - .
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counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. I d., at 325
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart observed, an
indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel
throughout the proceedings against him. Id., at 327. The
defendant was denied that right when he was subjected to an
"all-night inquisition," during which police ignored his repeated requests for his lawyer. Ibid.
The Court in M assiah adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that
right when federal agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating
statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. 377
U. S., at 206. The Court adopted this test, rather than one
that turned simply on whether the statements were obtained
in an "interrogation," to protect accused persons from" 'indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon . . . because he did not even know that he
was under interrogation by a government agent.'" Ibid.,
quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62, 72-73 (1962)
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the Court made clear
that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation> and that it
so viewed the technique in issue in M assiah. 20
In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of
M assiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] reThe defendant in M assiah made the incriminating statements in a conversation with one of his confederates, who had secretly agreed to permit
government agents to listen to the conversation over a radio transmitter.
The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation
relating to the alleged crimes." United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d, at 72
(Hays, J., dissenting in part).
20
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vealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used
his position to secure incriminating information from [the defendant] when counsel was not present." I d., at 270. Although the informant had not questioned the defendant, the
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant
in orde:t; to "elicit" incriminating information. I d., at 273;
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts,
like the facts of M assiah, amounted to "'indirect and surreptitious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. I d., at 273.
Earlier this term, we applied the M assiah standard in a
case involving incriminating statements made under circumstances substantially similar to the facts of M assiah itself.
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - (1985), the defendant
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accomplice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. I d., at
The Court concluded that these investigatory techniques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pending charges. 21 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, because of the relationship between the defendant and the
informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit"
incriminating statements from the defendant. I d., at - - ,
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversation was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Ibid.
21
The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course,
.
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Molton, supra, at -
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(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL,
J., concurring)).
As our recent recent examination of this Sixth Amendment
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the
M assiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at - - , citing United
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to
the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that
the police and their informant took some action, beyond
m~rely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.
B

It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from
any disagreement with the District Court over appropriate
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that open
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mistake, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correctness expressly required by 28 U.S. C. §2254(d). Patton v.
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539
(1981).
The state court found that Officer Cullen had instructed
Lee only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determining the identities of the other participants in the robbery and
murder. The police already had solid evidence of respond-
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ent's participation. 22 The court further found that Lee followed those instructions, that he "at no time asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending chargest and
that he "only listened" to respondent's "spontaneous" and
"unsolicited" statements. The only remark made by Lee
that has any support in this record was his comment that respondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes
"didn't sound too good." Without holding that any of the
state court's findings were not entitled to the presumption of
correctness under § 2254(d), 23 the Court of Appeals focused on
that one remark and gave a description of Lee's interaction
with respondent that is completely at odds with the facts
found by the trial court. In the Court of Appeals' view,
"Subtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's]
already troubled state of mind." 24 742 F. 2d, at 745. After
thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incriminating statements. Ibid. This conclusion conflicts with the
decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed
this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and
intent of§ 2254(d).
Eyewitnesses had identified respondent as the man they saw fleeing
from the garage with an armful of money.
28
The majority did not respond to Judge Van Graafeiland's criticism that
the court could not "dispense with the presumption that the State court's
factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation as to why the
findings are not fairly supported by the record ." 742 F . 2d, at 749 (citations omitted).
24
Curiously, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that respondent
was placed in a cell that overlooked the scene of his crimes. !d., at 745.
For all the record shows, however, that fact was sheer coincidence. Nor
do we perceive any reason to require police to isolate one charged with
crime so that he cannot view the scene, whatever it may be, from his cell
window.
22
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v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JusTICE MARSHALL joins, J
dissenting.
Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the "ends of justice" would be served by plenary
consideration of respondent's second federal habeas petition
and that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), directly controls the merits of this case, I dissent.
I

In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 15 (1963), we
held that a federal court may refuse to entertain a successive
~~
petition for habeas relief where "the ends of justice would not
be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent applica- -~4.-f£~ ...
tion." The decision whether to hear a successive petition,
we stated, was committed "to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges." I d., at 18. We declined to define pre- ~~
cisely "the ends of justice," observing that the phrase "cannot
~/-a__
be too finely particularized." I d., at 17.
~~
Today four Members of the Court argue that we should reject Sanders' "sound discretion" standard and contend that
~~
the ends of justice are served by reconsideration of issues
raised in previous federal habeas petitions only where the lo ~

-4
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~
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prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 1
Ante, at - - . In support of this standard for consideration
of successive petitions, the plurality advances a revisionist l
theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. The plu- 1
rality implies that federal habeas review is not available as a
matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first federal
petition a properly preserved claim that his conviction was
obtained in violation of constitutional commands. Rather,
the plurality suggests that a prisoner is entitled to habeas re- I
lief only if his interest in freedom from unconstitutional incarceration outweighs the State's interests in the administration
of its criminal laws. Ante, at--, - - . The plurality's 1
further intimates that federal review of state court convictions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 is predicated solely on the
need to prevent the incarceration of an innocent person, stating that "[d]espite [the substantial] costs [federal habeas review imposes upon the States], Congress has continued to afford federal habeas relief in appropriate cases, 'recognizing
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against
compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an unconstitutional
loss ofliberty."' Ante, at--, n. 16 (Slip Opinion 16, n. 15)
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491-492, n. 31
(1976)). Having thus implied that factual innocence is cen- \
tral to our habeas jurisprudence generally, the plurality ·de- I
clares that it is fundamental to the proper interpretation of
"the ends of justice." Neither the plurality's standard for 1
consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas
corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative history, or our precedents.
At least since the middle of this century, whei_YWe decided
lj:Valey v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), and"Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), it has been clear that "habeas lies to
inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial,"

l

· ~vV
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~15
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~...._/
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'While a majority of the Court today rejects, either implicity or explicitly, this argument, I believe it appropriate to explain why the plurality's
view is incorrect.
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vMackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 685-686 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), that has not been procedurally defaulted, with the narrow exception of Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule claims. Stone v. Powell,
supra. As we stated just two Terms ago, there is "no doubt
that in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to 'interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians
of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutionar action."' vReed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1, 10 (1984)
(quoting 'Mitchum v. Forster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972)).
Contrary to the plurality's assertions, the Court has never
delineated the general scope of the writ by weighing the competing interests of the prisoner and the State. Our cases addressing the propriety of federal collateral review of constitutional error made at trial or on appeal have balanced these
interests solely with respect to claims that were procedurally
defaulted in state court.
See, e. g., Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U. S. 72 (1977), Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 (1982);
Murray v. Carrier, - - U. S. - - (1986). Recognizing
that "the State's interest in the integrity of its rules and proceedings and the finality of its judgments ... would be undermined if the federal courts were too free to ignore procedural forfeitures in state court," Reed v. Ross, supra, at 10,
we held in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, that a state prisoner
generally must show cause and actual prejudice in order to
obtain federal habeas corpus relief of a procedurally defaulted
claim. See also Engle v. Isaac, supra. But even as we established the cause and prejudice standard in Wainwright v.
Sykes, supra, we emphasized that the "rule" of Brown v. Allen, supra, "that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he
is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in
violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have
the federal habeas court make its own independent determination of his federal claim ... is in no way changed," by
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our adoption of special rules for procedurally defaulted
claims. Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 87. 2
Furthermore, Stone v. Powell, supra, on which the plurality heavily relies, did not establish a new regime for federal
habeas corpus under which the prisoner's interests are
weighed against the State's interests and under which he
usually forfeits habeas review unless he can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence or unless the constitutional
right he seeks to protect generally furthers the accuracy of
factfinding at trial. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, the Court
expressly stated that its "decision ... [was] not concerned
with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for
litigating constitutional claims generally." I d., at 495, n. 37
(emphasis in original). Rather, the Court simply "reaffirm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right . . . and . . .
emphasiz[ed] the minimal utility of the [exclusionary] rule" in
the context of federal collateral proceedings. Ibid. Subsequent cases have uniformly construed Stone v. Powell as creating a special rule only for Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule claims and have repeatedly refused to extend its limitations on federal habeas review to any other context.
·Kimmelman v. Morrison,-- U. S. - - (1986) (declining
to extend Stone v. Powell to Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel claims where the principal allegation and manifestation of inadequate representation is
counsel's failure to litigate adequately a Fourth Amendment
claim); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (declining to ex2

In other words, we have recognized an exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the unusual cases where respect for the procedures of
state courts make this appropriate; such an exception is similar to abstention rules. See, e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co. 319 U. S. 315 (1943). However, like other judicially created
exceptions to federal jurisdiction conferred by Congress, it is a narrow exception to the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise that jurisdiction.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800,
817 (1976).

j
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tend Stone v. Powell to claims of racial discrimination in the
selection of grand jury foremen); Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (1979) (declining to extend Stone v. Powell to
claims by state prisoners that the evidence in support of their
convictions was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact
to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required under In
re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)).
Despite the plurality's intimations, we simply have never I~ ~ ~
held that federal habeas review ~ro erly resented,
.L- ~
nondefaulted constitutional claims is lim1tea either to con~1
·
stitutional protections that advance the accuracy of the
~ ~
factfinding process at trial or is available solely to prisoners
__ j.../
who can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence. S ~
PY
__;
On the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas re- - - ; - view "what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' inno- ~ ~
cence or guilt but solely the question whether their coristitu~
L ~
tional rights have been preserved." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 ~
U. S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Congress has vested
habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts over all cases in ~
which the petitioner claims he has been detained "in violation
of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28 ~ 1
U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3), and, "[t]he constitutional rights of crim0
inal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty ~ .
alike." Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, at--. Thus:
.

"Even if punishment ~he 'gu~: were society's highest
value ... in a constitution th~:~me] Members of this
Court would prefer, that is not the ?rdering of priorities
under the Constitution forged by tpe Framers
....
Particular constitutional rights tryat do not affect the
fairness of factfinding proced~:~s;annot for that reason
be denied at the trial itself. wJla~ possible justification
then can there be for denying indication of such right's
on federal habeas when state ourts do deny those rights
at trial?" Stone v. Powell, 4 8 U. S., at 523-525 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
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The habeas statute itself certainly does not provide any justification, either for limiting the scope of habeas review generally or for narrowly defining the ends of justice to make habeas relief available on a successive petition only to prisoners
who can make a colorable showing of factual innocence.
With respect to the general scope of federal habeas review,
§ 2241 , which grants federal courts the statutory authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus, makes no mention of guilt and
innocence or of the need to balance the interests of the State
and the prisoner. In pertinent part, it states simply that
"[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3).
Nor does anything in the legislative history of the habeas
statute support the view that Congress intended to limit habeas review in the manner proposed by the Court. For
more than 30 years, our construction of the habeas statute to
permit federal collateral review of virtually all nondefaulted
constitutional claims-with the narrow exception, over dissent, of Fourth Amendment claims, without reference to actual guilt or innocence or to the competing interests of the
State and the prisoner, has been unmistakably clear. See,
Brown v. Allen, supra. Several times during this period,
Congress has had the Court's interpretation expressly
brought to its attention through bills proposing drastic revision of federal habeas jurisdiction. See L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies § 19, pp. 91-92 (1981) (describing relevant
bills introduced in past several Congresses). Each of those
times, Congress steadfastly refused to make any significant
changes in this Court's construction of that jurisdiction.
§ 19, id., at 92 ("[S]ince 1948 the only amendments to the [habeas] statutes that the Congress has approved have ... simply tracked contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions")
(footnote omitted). The fact that Congress has been made
aware of our longstanding construction and has chosen to
leave it undisturbed, "lends powerful support to [its] contin-

I
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ued viability." Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bur., 476 U. S. - , - (1986).
With regard to the specific question whether factual innocence is a precondition for review of a successive habeas petition, neither § 2244(b)-which governs applications for writs
~~
of habeas corpus to state courts that are filed subsequent to
the disposition of a prior federal habeas petition, its legislative history, nor the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
~/u~.
the United States District Courts (hereafter Rules Governing Section 2254), support the plurality's position. Section
~~-~
2244(b), as amended in 1966, states in relevant part that a
subsequent petition "need not be entertained ... unless the
~
application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other
ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier applica~
tion for the writ, and unless the court ... is satisfied that the
applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the
writ." (Emphasis added). By its very terms, then,
§ 2244(b) merely informs district courts that they need not
consider successive petitions; that is, the statute gives district courts the discretion not to hear such petitions. Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254, which
were adopted in 1976, states that a "second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse
of the writ." (Emphasis added).
Congress clearly intended that courts continue to determine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear -~b=~~/::llll.....
_.
d> ?'i -#4
ll
by reference to the Sanders ends of justice standard. First,
~~
not ing m t e ouse or ena · eyora-accbnlpanying the .abill that amended § 2244 in 1966 suggests that Congress ~f-wished to abandon the Sanders standard. See H. R. Rep. ~
No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th

~

~

J
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Gong., 2d Sess. (1966). Second, the legislative history of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 demonstrates that in adopting
Rule 9(b) Congress expressly endorsed the existing case law
governing subsequent petitions and cited Sanders. 3 H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). Third, the Advisory
Committee's Notes relating to Rule 9(b) state that Sanders
provides the relevant standards for subsequent petitions and
indicate that the district courts have the discretion to refuse
to entertain vexatious and meritless subsequent petitions:
"In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the
court, in dealing with the problem of successive applications, stated:
"'Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior
application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only
if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the
merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.'
[Emphasis added]."
"Sanders, [28] U. S. C. § 2244, and [Rule 9(b)] make it
clear that the court has the discretion to entertain a successive application.
"Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and
well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not
eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully
entitled. However, in Sanders, the court pointed out:
3
While the discussion in the House Report regarding Rule 9(b) focuses
on that portion of the rule that governs abuse of the writ, rather than petitions that repeatedly allege the same claims, it is clear that the Committee
intended Rule 9(b) to conform in its entirety to existing case law, particularly to Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963). See H. R. Rep.
No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976).
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"'Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires
the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only
purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.' 373 U. S. at 18.
"... In rare instances, the court may feel a need to
entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already
been decided on the merits. Sanders, 373 U. S. at 1,
16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discouraged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough to require a means of dealing with them. For example, a
successive application, already decided on the merits,
may be submitted in the hope of getting before a different judge in multijudge courts. . . .
This subdivision
is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions . . . so
that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and
fuller consideration." 28 U. S. C., p. 358.
The Advisory Committee gave no indication that the problem Rule 9(b), or § 2244(b), seek to correct is that of a guilty
prisoner seeking repeated federal review of the same constitutional claim. Rather, it is apparent that the Rule attempts to remedy only the problem posed by vexatious and
meritless subsequent petitions. The Committee explicitly
contemplated, though, that nonabusive, "meritorious [subsequent] petitions" would receive "full[] consideration." Ibid.
When we review habeas cases, our task is "to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction enacted by Congress."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.). With respect to successive habeas petitions, giving "fair
effect" to the intent of Congress is to construe "the ends of
justice" as Sanders did-to mean that it is within the sound
discretion of the court to refuse to hear abusive, meritless petitions and to hear petitions in which the prisoner advances a
potentially meritorious claim and provides a good justification for returning to court a second time with the same
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claim. 4
In the instant case, respondent alleged a potentially meritorious Sixth Amendment claim. He also advanced a complete justification for returning to federal court a second time
with this claim. Between his first and second federal habeas
petitions, this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447
U. S. 264 (1980), a case in which the facts were substantially
similar to the facts of respondent's case 5 and in which we
elaborated on the Sixth Amendment's prohibition against
government interference with an accused's right to counsel, a
prohibition that we had previously recognized in M assiah v.
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams,
430 U. S. 387 (1977). The intervention of Henry, supra,
clarified the appropriate analysis for Sixth Amendment
claims like respondent's; thus the Court of Appeals did not
abuse its discretion by granting reconsideration of respondent's constitutional claim under the dispositive legal
standard. 6
• I agree with the plurality that actual innocence constitutes a sufficient
justification for returning to court a secona t1me with the same claim. I do
not agree, though , that a prisoner's inability to make a showing of actual
innocence negates an otherwise good justification, such as respondent's.
s The facts of this case demonstrate the ·arbitrariness of the Court's rule.
The initial federal habeas petitions filed by respondent and by Henry presented virtually identical claims. Because our decision in United States v.
Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), may have altered the law of the Circuit in
which respondent's prior petition failed , it is only just that respondent's
claim be reviewed under the proper constitutional standards.
6
The plurality's factual innocence standard also presents some significant institutional problems. First, this standard requires the federal
courts to function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact-the
federal courts must make a rough decision on the question of guilt or innocence. This requirement diverts the federal courts from the central purpose of habeas review-the evaluation of claims that convictions were obtained in violation of the Constitution. Second, it is unclear what
relevance the plurality's standard would have in a case in which a prisoner
alleges constitutional error in the sentencing phase of a capital case. Guilt
or innocence is irrelevant in that context; rather, there is only a decision
made by representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live
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II

The Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred with respect to the merits of respondent's habeas petition. According to the Court, the Court of Appeals failed to accord
§ 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to the state trial
court's findings that respondent's cellmate, Lee, "at no time
asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending
charges, and that Lee only listened to respondent's "spontaneous" and "unsolicited" statements, App. 62-63. As a result, the Court concludes, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that this case presents the question, reserved in
Henry, supra, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids the admission into evidence of an accused's statements to a
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged." Id., at 271, n. 9. I disagree with the Court's
characterization of the Court of Appeals' treatment of the
state court's findings and, consequently, I disagree with the
Court that the instant case presents the "listening post" '
question.
The state trial court simply found that Lee did not ask respondent any direct questions about the crime for which respondent was incarcerated. App. 62-63. The trial court
considered the significance of this fact only under State precedents, which the court interpreted to require affirmative
"interrogation" by the informant as a prerequisite to a constitutional violation. I d., at 63. The court did not indicate
whether it referred to a Fifth Amendment or to a Sixth
Amendment violation in identifying "interrogation" as a precondition to a violation; it merely stated that "the utterances
made by [respondent] to Lee were unsolicited, and voluntarily made and did not violate the defendant's Constitutional
rights." Ibid.
or die. Presumably, then, the plurality's test would not be applicable to
such claims.
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The Court of Appeals did not disregard the state court's
finding that Lee asked respondent no direct questions regarding the crime. Rather, the Court of Appeals expressly
accepted that finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741,
745 (CA2 1984) ("[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wilson any direct questions, ... "), but concluded that, as a matter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard of Henry,
supra, and Massiah, supra, encompasses other, more subtle
forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt
questioning. The court suggested that the police deliberately placed respondent in a cell that overlooked the scene of
the crime, hoping that the view would trigger an inculpatory
comment to respondent's cellmate. 7 The court also observed that, while Lee asked respondent no questions, Lee
nonetheless stimulated conversation concerning respondents'
role in the Star Taxicab Garage robbery and murder by remarking that respondent's exculpatory story did not "'sound
too good'" and that he had better come up with a better one.
742 F. 2d, at 745 . . Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the respondent's case did not present the situation reserved
in Henry, where an accused makes an incriminating remark
within the hearing of a jailhouse informant, who "makes no
effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged."
447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. Instead, the court determined this
case to be virtually indistinguishable from Henry.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused, at least
after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on
counsel as the "medium" between himself and the State.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - , - - (1985). Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice
to seek [the assistance of counsel]," id., at--, and therefore "[t]he determination whether particular action by state
7
The Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s soon as Wilson arrived and
viewed the garage, he became upset and stated that "someone's messing
with me,'" 742 F. 2d, at 745.
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agents violates the accused's right to ... counsel must be
made in light of this obligation." I d., at - - - - - . To be
sure, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever, "by
luck or happenstance," the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. It is violated, however, when "the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the
accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent." I d., at (footnote omitted). As we explained in Henry, where the accused has not
waived his right to counsel, the government knowingly circumvents the defendant's right to counsel where it "deliberately elicit[s]" inculpatory admissions, 447 U. S., at 270, that
is, "intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [the accused] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel." I d., at 274.
In Henry, we found that the Federal Government had "deliberately elicited" incriminating statements from Henry
based on the following circumstances. The jailhouse informant, Nichols, had apparently followed instructions to obtain
information without directly questioning Henry and without
initiating conversations concerning the charges pending
against Henry. We rejected the Government's argument
that because Henry initiated the discussion of his crime, no
Sixth Amendment violation had occurred.
We pointed out
that under M assiah, supra, it is irrelevant whether the informant asks pointed questions about the crime or "merely
engage[s] in general conversation about it." 447 U. S., at
271-272, and n. 10. Nichols, we noted, "was not a passive
listener; ... he had 'some conversations with Mr. Henry'
. while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements
were 'the product of this conversation."' I d., at 271.
In deciding that Nichols' role in these conversations
amounted to deliberate elicitation, we also found three other
factors important. First, Nichols was to be paid for any information he produced and thus had an incentive to extract

84-1479-DISSENT
14

KUHLMANN v. WILSON

inculpatory admissions from Henry. /d., at 270. Second,
Henry was not aware that Nichols was acting as .an informant. Ibid. "Conversation stimulated in such circumstances," we observed, "may elicit information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be
Government agents." !d., at 273. Third, Henry was incustody at the time he spoke with Nichols. This last fact is significant, we stated, because "custody imposes pressures on
the accused [and] confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the
ploys of undercover Government agents." I d., at 274. We
concluded that by "intentionally creating a situation likely to
induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." Ibid. (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, as in Henry, the accused was incarcerated and therefore was "susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents." Ibid. Like Nichols, Lee was a
secret informant, usually received consideration for the services he rendered the police, and therefore had an incentive to
produce the information which he knew the police hoped to
obtain. Just as Nichols had done, Lee obeyed instructions
not to question respondent and to report to the police any
statements made by the respondent in Lee's presence about
the crime in question. App. 62. And, like Nichols, Lee encouraged respondent to talk about his crime by conversing
with him on the subject over the course of several days and
by telling respondent that his exculpatory story would not
convince anyone without more work. However, unlike the
situation in Henry, a disturbing visit from respondent's
brother, rather than a conversation with the informant,
seems to have been the immediate catalyst for respondent's
confession to Lee. Ante, at--; Wilson v. Henderson, 82
Civ. 4397 (SDNY, Mar. 30, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert.
25a-26a. While it might appear from this sequence of events
that Lee's comment regarding respondent's story and his
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general willingness to converse with respondent about the
crime were not the immediate causes of respondent's admission, I think that the deliberate elicitation standard requires
consideration of the entire course of government behavior.
The State intentionally created a situation in which it was
forseeable that respondent would make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, Henry, supra, at
274--it assigned respondent to a cell overlooking the scene of
the crime and designated a secret informant to be respondent's cellmate. The informant, while avoiding direct questions, nonetheless developed a relationship of cellmate camaraderie with respondent and encouraged him to talk about his
crime. While the coup de grace was delivered by respondent's brother, the groundwork for respondent's confession
was laid by the State. Clearly the State's actions had a sufficient nexus with respondent's admission of guilt to constitute
deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Henry. I would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the "ends of justice" would be served by plenary
consideration of respondent's second federal habeas petition
and that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980),
directly controls the merits of this case, I dissent.
I

In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 15 (1963), we
held that a federal court may refuse to entertain a successive
petition for habeas relief where "the ends of justice would not
be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." The decision whether to hear a successive petition,
we stated, was committed "to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges." I d., at 18. We declined to define precisely "the ends of justice," observing that the phrase "cannot
be too finely particularized." ld., at 17.
Today four Members of the Court argue that we should reject Sanders' "sound discretion" standard and contend that
the ends of justice are served by reconsideration of issues
raised in previous federal habeas petitions only where the
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prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 1
Ante, at--. In support of this standard for consideration
of successive petitions, the plurality advances a revisionist
theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. The plurality implies that federal habeas review is not available as a
matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first federal
petition a properly preserved claim that his conviction was
obtained in violation of constitutional commands. Rather,
the plurality suggests that a prisoner is entitled to habeas relief only if his interest in freedom from unconstitutional incarceration outweighs the State's interests in the administration
of its criminal laws. Ante, at - - , - - . The plurality's
further intimates that federal review of state court convictions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 is predicated solely on the
need to prevent the incarceration of an innocent person, stating that "[d]espite [the substantial] costs [federal habeas review imposes upon the States], Congress has continued to afford federal habeas relief in appropriate cases, 'recognizing
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against
compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an unconstitutional
loss of liberty."' Ante, at--, n. 16 (Slip Opinion 16, n. 15)
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491-492, n. 31
(1976)). Having thus implied that factual innocence is central to our habeas jurisprudence generally, the plurality declares that it is fundamental to the proper interpretation of
"the ends of justice." Neither the plurality's standard for
consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas
corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative history, or our pr-ecedents. 2
'While a majority of the Court today rejects, either implicity or explicitly, this argument, I believe it appropriate to explain why the plurality's
view is incorrect.
2
The plurality asserts, ante, a t - , n. 18 (Slip op. at 18, n. 18), that it
addresses only the standard applicable to successive habeas petitions and
that I mischaracterize its opinion by suggesting that the dictum, contained
in Part II-B of the plurality's opinion, regarding the purpose and the scope
of the Great Writ has any significance. While the plurality correctly
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At least since the middle of this century, when we decided
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), and Brown v.
Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), it has been clear that "habeas lies
to inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal
trial," Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 685-686
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), that has not
been procedurally defaulted, with the narrow exception of
states that what would have been the holding of Part III of its opinion, had
that Part commanded a Court, would have directly governed only successive petitions, methinks my brothers and sister protest too much about
their general discussion of the writ. In order to mask the fact that it fashions its actual innocence standard from whole cloth, the plurality attempts
to justify that standard by reference to the plurality's view of "the historic
function of habeas corpus." !d., at-- (Slip op. at 14); see also id. , at
--(Slip op. at 17). Consequently, in order to comment upon the plurality's standard for successive petitions, I find it necessary first to address
the plurality's treatment of the general scope and purposes of the Great
Writ. Thus, the "first six pages of the dissent," id. , at - -, (slip. op. at
18, n. 18), has as much h levance 1t o this case as does Part 11-B of the plurality's opinion.
The plurality further chastises me for failing to propose a precise definition of the "ends of justice" standard of Sanders v. United States , 373 U. S.
1, 15 (1963) and for adhering to Sanders by leaving the decision whether to
hear successive petitions to the "sound discretion of the federal trial
judges." I d., at 18. The plurality argues that Sanders left open "the
question of what considerations should inform a court's decision that successive review of an issue previously decided will serve the 'ends of justice.'" Ante, at - - (slip op. at 19, n. 18). Sanders did leave that question open, but in a different sense than the plurality suggests. In
Sanders, we acknowledged that the meaning of the phrase "the ends of justice . . . cannot be too finely particularized," supra, at 17, and, in recognition of this fact , we left it to the "sound discretion" of federal trial judges to
make case-by-case determinations of what the ends of justice require.
The plurality, while purporting merely to elucidate Sanders "sound discretion" standard, would replace discretion with a single legal standard-actual innocence. And, while the plurality asserts that there is a need for a
more refined standard, it offers no evidence that, over the 23 years since
Sanders was decided , federal trial courts have had difficulty applying the
"sound discretion" standard or have so abused their discretion with respect
to successive petitions that revision of our longstanding interpretation of
§ 2244(b) is warranted.
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Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. Stone v. Powell, supra. As we stated just two Terms ago, there is "no
doubt that in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to 'interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action."' Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S.
1, 10 (1984) (quoting Mitchum v. Forster, 407 U. S. 225, 242
(1972)).
Contrary to the plurality's assertions, the Court has never
delineated the general scope of the writ by weighing the competing interests of the prisoner and the State. Our cases addressing the propriety of federal collateral review of constitutional error made at trial or on appeal have balanced these
interests solely with respect to claims that were procedurally
defaulted in state court.
See, e. g., Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U. S. 72 (1977), Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 (1982);
Murray v. Carrier, - - U. S. - - (1986). Recognizing
that "the State's interest in the integrity of its rules and proceedings and the finality of its judgments . . . would be undermined if the federal courts were too free to ignore procedural forfeitures in state court," Reed v. Ross, supra, at 10,
we held in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, that a state prisoner
generally must show cause and actual prejudice in order to
obtain federal habeas corpus relief of a procedurally defaulted
claim. See also Engle v. Isaac, supra. But even as we established the cause and prejudice standard in Wainwright v.
Sykes, supra, we emphasized that the "rule" of Brown v. Allen, supra, "that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he
is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in
violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have
the federal habeas court make its own independent determination of his federal claim ... is in no way changed," by
our adoption of special rules for procedurally defaulted
claims. Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 87. 3
3
In other words , we have recognized an exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the unusual cases where respect for the procedures of
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Furthermore, Stone v. Powell, supra, on which the plurality heavily relies, did not establish a new regime for federal
habeas corpus under which the prisoner's interests are
weighed against the State's interests and under which he
usually forfeits habeas review unless he can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence or unless the constitutional
right he seeks to protect generally furthers the accuracy of
factfinding at trial. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, the Court
expressly stated that its "decision ... [was] not concerned
with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for
litigating constitutional claims generally." I d., at 495, n. 37
(emphasis in original). Rather, the Court simply "reaffirm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right . . . and . . .
emphasiz[ed] the minimal utility of the [exclusionary] rule" in
the context of federal collateral proceedings. Ibid. Subsequent cases have uniformly construed Stone v. Powell as creating a special rule only for Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule claims and have repeatedly refused to extend its limitations on federal habeas review to any other context.
Kimmelman v. Morrison,-- U.S.-- (1986) (declining
to extend Stone v. Powell to Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel claims where the principal allegation and manifestation of inadequate representation is counsel's failure to litigate adequately a Fourth Amendment
claim); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (declining to extend Stone v. Powell to claims of racial discrimination in the
selection of grand jury foremen); Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (1979) (declining to extend_Stone v. Powell to
state courts make this appropriate; such an exception is similar to abstention rules. See, e. g., Younger v. Harris , 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co. 319 U. S. 315 (1943). However, like other judicially created
exceptions to federal jurisdiction conferred by Congress, it is a narrow exception to the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise that jurisdiction.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800,
817 (1976).
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claims by state prisoners that the evidence in support of their
convictions was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact
to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required under In
re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)).
Despite the plurality's intimations, we simply have never
held that federal habeas review of properly presented,
nondefaulted constitutional claims is limited either to constitutional protections that advance the accuracy of the
factfinding process at trial or is available solely to prisoners
who can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence.
On the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas review "what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U. S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Congress has vested
habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts over all cases in
which the petitioner claims he has been detained "in violation
of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28
U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3), and, "[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike." Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, at--. Thus:
"Even if punishment of the 'guilty' were society's highest
value ... in a constitution that [some] Members of this
Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities
under the Constitution forged by the Framers
Particular constitutional rights that do not affect the
fairness of factfinding procedures cannot for that reason
be denied at the trial itself. What possible justification
then can there be for denying vindication of such rights
on federal habeas when state courts do deny those rights
at trial?" Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 523-525 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
The habeas statute itself certainly does not provide any justification, either for limiting the scope of habeas review generally or for narrowly defining the ends of justice to make ha-
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beas relief available on a successive petition only to prisoners
who can make a colorable showing of factual innocence.
With respect to the general scope of federal habeas review,
§ 2241, which grants federal courts the statutory authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus, makes no mention of guilt and
innocence or of the need to balance the interests of the State
and the prisoner. In pertinent part, it states simply that
"[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3).
Nor does anything in the legislative history of the habeas
statute support the view that Congress intended to limit habeas review in the manner proposed by the Court. For
more than 30 years, our construction of the habeas statute to
permit federal collateral review of virtually all nondefaulted
constitutional claims-with the narrow exception, over dissent, of Fourth Amendment claims, without reference to actual guilt or innocence or to the competing interests of the
State and the prisoner, has been unmistakably clear. See,
Brown v. Allen, supra. Several times during this period,
Congress has had the Court's interpretation expressly
brought to its attention through bills proposing drastic revision of federal habeas jurisdiction. See L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies § 19, pp. 91-92 (1981) (describing relevant
bills introduced in past several Congresses). Each of those
times, Congress steadfastly refused to make any significant
changes in this Court's construction of that jurisdiction.
§ 19, id., at 92 ("[S]ince 1948 the only amendments to the [habeas] statut~s that the Congress has approved have ... simply tracked contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions")
(footnote omitted). The fact that Congress has been made
aware of our longstanding construction and has chosen to
leave it undisturbed, "lends powerful support to [its] continued viability." Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bur., 476 U . S . - , - (1986).
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With regard to the specific question whether factual innocence is a precondition for review of a successive habeas petition, neither § 2244(b)-which governs applications for writs
of habeas corpus to state courts that are filed subsequent to
the disposition of a prior federal habeas petition, its legislative history, nor the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts (hereafter Rules Governing Section 2254), support the plurality's position. Section
2244(b), as amended in 1966, states in relevant part that a
subsequent petition "need not be entertained . . . unless the
application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other
ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court . . . is satisfied that the
applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the
writ." (Emphasis added). By its very terms, then,
§ 2244(b) merely informs district courts that they need not
consider successive petitions; that is, the statute gives district courts the discretion not to hear such petitions. Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254, which
were adopted in 1976, states that a "second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse
of the writ." (Emphasis added).
Congress clearly intended that courts continue to determine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear
by reference to the Sanders ends of justice standard. First,
nothing in the House or Senate Reports accompanying the
bill that amended § 2244 in 1966 suggests that Congress
wished to abandon the Sanders standard. See H. R. Rep.
No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Second, the legislative history of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 demonstrates that in adopting
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Rule 9(b) Congress expressly endorsed the existing case law
governing subsequent petitions and cited Sanders. 4 H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). Third, the Advisory
Committee's Notes relating to Rule 9(b) state that Sanders
provides the relevant standards for subsequent petitions and
indicate that the district courts have the discretion to refuse
to entertain vexatious and meritless subsequent petitions:
"In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the
court, in dealing with the problem of successive applications, stated:
"'Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior
application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only
if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the
merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.'
[Emphasis added]."

"Sanders, [28] U. S. C. § 2244, and [Rule 9(b)] make it
clear that the court has the discretion to entertain a successive application.
"Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and
well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not
eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully
entitled. However, in Sanders, the court pointed out:
" 'Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires
the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litiga' While the discussion in the House Report regarding Rule 9(b) focuses
on that portion of the rule that governs abuse of the writ, rather than petitions that repeatedly allege the same claims, it is clear that the Committee
intended Rule 9(b) to conform in its entirety to existing case law, particularly to Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963). See H. R. Rep.
No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976).
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tion, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only
purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.' 373 U. S. at 18.
". .. In rare instances, the court may feel a need to
entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already
been decided on the merits. Sanders, 373 U. S. at 1,
16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discouraged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough torequire a means of dealing with them. For example, a
successive application, already decided on the merits,
may be submitted in the hope of getting before a different judge in multijudge courts. . . .
This subdivision
is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions ... so
that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and
fuller consideration." 28 U. S. C., p. 358.
The Advisory Committee gave no indication that the problem Rule 9(b), or § 2244(b), seek to correct is that of a guilty
prisoner seeking repeated federal review of the same constitutional claim. Rather, it is apparent that the Rule attempts to remedy only the problem posed by vexatious and
meritless subsequent petitions. The Committee explicitly
contemplated, though, that nonabusive, "meritorious [subsequent] petitions" would receive "full[] consideration." Ibid.
When we review habeas cases, our task is "to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction enacted by Congress."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.). With respect to successive habeas petitions, giving "fair
effect" to the intent of Congress is to construe "the ends of
justice" as Sanders did-to mean that it is within the sound
discretion of the court to refuse to hear abusive, meritless petitions and to hear petitions in which the prisoner advances a
potentially meritorious claim and provides a good justification for returning to court a second time with the same
claim. 5
6
I agree with the plurality that actual innocence constitutes a sufficient
justification for returning to court a second time with the same claim. I do
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In the instant case, respondent alleged a potentially meritorious Sixth Amendment claim. He also advanced a complete justification for returning to federal court a second time
with this claim. Between his first and second federal habeas
petitions, this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447
U. S. 264 (1980), a case in which the facts were substantially
similar to the facts of respondent's case 6 and in which we
elaborated on the Sixth Amendment's prohibition against
government interference with an accused's right to counsel, a
prohibition that we had previously recognized in M assiah v.
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams,
430 U. S. 387 (1977). The intervention of Henry, supra,
clarified the appropriate analysis for Sixth Amendment
claims like respondent's; thus the Court of Appeals did not
abuse its discretion by granting reconsideration of respondent's constitutional claim under the dispositive legal
standard. 7
not agree, though, that a prisoner's inability to make a showing of actual
innocence negates an otherwise good justification, such as respondent's.
6
The facts of this case demonstrate the arbitrariness of the Court's rule.
The initial federal habeas petitions filed by respondent and by Henry presented virtually identical claims. Because our decision in United States v.
Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), may have altered the law of the Circuit in
which respondent's prior petition failed, it is only just that respondent's
claim be reviewed under the proper constitutional standards.
7
The plurality's factual innocence standard also presents some significant institutional problems. First, this standard requires the federal
courts to function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact-the
federal courts must make a rough decision on the question of guilt or innocence. This requirement diverts the federal courts from the central purpose of habeas review-the evaluation of claims that convictions were obtained in violation of the Constitution. Second, it is unclear what
relevance the plurality's standard would have in a case in which a prisoner
alleges constitutional error in the sentencing phase of a capital case. Guilt
or innocence is irrelevant in that context; rather, there is only a decision
made by representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live
or die. Presumably, then, the plurality's test would not be applicable to
such claims.
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II

The Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred with respect to the merits of respondent's habeas petition. According to the Court, the Court of Appeals failed to accord
§ 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to the state trial
court's findings that respondent's cellmate, Lee, "at no time
asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending
charges, and that Lee only listened to respondent's "spontaneous" and "unsolicited" statements, App. 62-63. As a result, the Court concludes, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that this case presents the question, reserved in
Henry, supra, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids the admission into evidence of an accused's statements to a
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged." Id., at 271, n. 9. I disagree with the Court's
characterization of the Court of Appeals' treatment of the
state court's findings and, consequently, I disagree with the
Court that the instant case presents the "listening post"
question.
The state trial court simply found that Lee did not ask respondent any direct questions about the crime for which respondent was incarcerated. App. 62-63. The trial court
considered the significance of this fact only under State precedents, which the court interpreted to require affirmative
"interrogation" by the informant as a prerequisite to a constitutional violation. I d., at 63. The court did not indicate
whether it referred to a Fifth Amendment or to a Sixth
Amendment violation in identifying "interrogation" as a precondition to a violation; it merely stated that "the utterances
made by [respondent] to Lee were unsolicited, and voluntarily made and did not violate the defendant's Constitutional
rights." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals did not disregard the state court's
finding that Lee asked respondent no direct questions re-
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garding the crime. Rather, the Court of Appeals expressly
accepted that finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741,
745 (CA2 1984) ("[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wilson any direct questions, ... "),but concluded that, as a matter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard of Henry,
supra, and Massiah, supra, encompasses other, more subtle
forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt
questioning. The court suggested that the police deliberately placed respondent in a cell that overlooked the scene of
the crime, hoping that the view would trigger an inculpatory
comment to respondent's cellmate. 8 The court also observed that, while Lee asked respondent no questions, Lee
nonetheless stimulated conversation concerning respondents'
role in the Star Taxicab Garage robbery and murder by remarking that respondent's exculpatory story did not "'sound
too good'" and that he had better come up with a better one.
742 F. 2d, at 745. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the respondent's case did not present the situation reserved
in Henry, where an accused makes an incriminating remark
within the hearing of a jailhouse informant, who "makes no
effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged."
447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. Instead, the court determined this
case to be virtually indistinguishable from Henry.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused, at least
after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on
counsel as the "medium" between himself and the State.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - , - - (1985). Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice
to seek [the assistance of counsel]," id., at--, and therefore "[t]he determination whether particular action by state
agents violates the accused's right to ... counsel must be
made in light of this obligation." I d., at - - - - - . To be
8

The Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s soon as Wilson arrived and
viewed the garage, he became upset and stated that "someone's messing
with me,"' 742 F. 2d, at 745.

84-1479-DISSENT
14

KUHLMANN v. WILSON

sure, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever, "by
luck or happenstance," the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. It is violated, however, when "the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the
accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent." I d., at (footnote omitted). As we explained in Henry, where the accused has not
waived his right to counsel, the government knowingly circumvents the defendant's right to counsel where it "deliberately elicit[s]" inculpatory admissions, 447 U. S., at 270, that
is, "intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [the accused] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel." Id., at 274.
In Henry, we found that the Federal Government had "deliberately elicited" incriminating statements from Henry
based on the following circumstances. The jailhouse informant, Nichols, had apparently followed instructions to obtain
information without directly questioning Henry and without
initiating conversations concerning the charges pending
against Henry. We rejected the Government's argument
that because Henry initiated the discussion of his crime, no
Sixth Amendment violation had occurred.
We pointed out
that under M assiah, supra, it is irrelevant whether the informant asks pointed questions about the crime or "merely
engage[s] in general conversation about it." 447 U. S., at
271-272, and n. 10. Nichols, we noted, "was not a passive
listener; . . . he had 'some conversations with Mr. Henry'
while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements
were 'the product of this conversation.'" I d., at 271.
In deciding that Nichols' role in these conversations
amounted to deliberate elicitation, we also found three other
factors important. First, Nichols was to be paid for any information he produced and thus had an incentive to extract
inculpatory admissions from Henry. Id., at 270. Second,
Henry was not aware that Nichols was acting as an inform-
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ant. Ibid. "Conversation stimulated in such circumstances," we observed, "may elicit information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be
Government agents." /d., at 273. Third, Henry was incustody at the time he spoke with Nichols. This last fact is significant, we stated, because "custody imposes pressures on
the accused [and] confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the
ploys of undercover Government agents." /d., at 274. We
concluded that by "intentionally creating a situation likely to
induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." Ibid. (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, as in Henry, the accused was incarcerated and therefore was "susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents." Ibid. Like Nichols, Lee was a
secret informant, usually received consideration for the services he rendered the police, and therefore had an incentive to
produce the information which he knew the police hoped to
obtain. Just as Nichols had done, Lee obeyed instructions
not to question respondent and to report to the police any
statements made by the respondent in Lee's presence about
the crime in question. App. 62. And, like Nichols, Lee encouraged respondent to talk about his crime by conversing
with him on the subject over the course of several days and
by telling respondent that his exculpatory story would not
convince anyone without more work. However, unlike the
situation in Henry, a disturbing visit from respondent's
brother, rather than a conversation with the informant,
seems to have been the immediate catalyst for respondent's
confession to Lee. Ante, at--; Wilson v. Henderson, 82
Civ. 4397 (SDNY, Mar. 30, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert.
25a-26a. While it might appear from this sequence of events
that Lee's comment regarding respondent's story and his
general willingness to converse with respondent about the
crime were not the immediate causes of respondent's admis-
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sion, I think that the deliberate elicitation standard requires
consideration of the entire course of government behavior.
The State intentionally created a situation in which it was
forseeable that respondent would make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, Henry, supra, at
274--it assigned respondent to a cell overlooking the scene of
the crime and designated a secret informant to be respondent's cellmate. The informant, while avoiding direct questions, nonetheless developed a relationship of cellmate camaraderie with respondent and encouraged him to talk about his
crime. While the coup de grace was delivered by respondent's brother, the groundwork for respondent's confession
was laid by the State. Clearly the State's actions had a sufficient nexus with respondent's admission of guilt to constitute
deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Henry. I would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

